‘between the dragon and his wrath’, 1994–2017cia informed about the activities of ’Osama bin Laden, who was living in
Kandahar as a guest of the Taliban and occupied the compound opposite
the company.
The combined influence of Pakistan and unocal was a significant
factor in the State Department’s lack of concern at the Taliban’s takeover or
its puritanical Islamic regime. Indeed, the State Department even consid-
ered reopening its embassy in Kabul. As far as Washington was concerned,
the Taliban were not that bad since they had restored law and order, nor
was the Taliban’s harsh Islamic order seen as a problem, at least initially.
After all Saudi Arabia, America’s most important ally in the Muslim world,
imposed even stricter gender policies and regularly beheaded adulterers
in public. Following the fall of Mazar-i Sharif, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan
and Russia warned the State Department that there was a risk of a regional
conflict, but Washington showed more concern about Iranian military
support for Hizb-i Wahdat, Dostam and the Northern Alliance. In April
1996 Robin Raphel, President Clinton’s Assistant Secretary of State, even
visited Kandahar and held meetings with the Taliban leadership and
publicly endorsed unocal’s bid for the pipeline.
A month after Raphel’s visit, ’Osama bin Laden, whom the cia had
noted to be ‘one of the most significant financial sponsors of Islamic terror-
ist activities in the world’, 4 and who had been funding terrorist camps in
Somalia and been expelled from Sudan, landed in Jalalabad in response to a
specific invitation by Mullah ‘Omar. As part of his conditions of sanctuary,
bin Laden undertook not to engage in subversive actions against America
or other foreign nations. A few months later cia operatives covertly visited
Mas‘ud in the hope he could be persuaded to mount a snatch-and-grab
operation and capture bin Laden, but Mas‘ud told them he had no power
or influence in Kandahar. Instead, he asked the cia for cash and military
equipment so he could regain control over Afghanistan, but his request
was turned down. Mas‘ud also warned his guests that the Taliban’s offer of
sanctuary to bin Laden risked turning Afghanistan into a centre of inter-
national terrorism. Following his fallout with the Taliban, Hamid Karzai
too warned the cia and u.s. diplomats in Islamabad about the threat posed
by bin Laden, as did General Dostam. Their requests for military assistance
from the usa and nato powers however were rejected.
It was not until 1997, after Madeleine Albright became Secretary of
State, that the State Department adopted a more critical approach to the
Taliban, but mostly because the movement continued to provide a safe
haven for ’Osama bin Laden, rather than their human rights record. In
August of that year bin Laden, in breach of his promise to Mullah ‘Omar,