afghanistanissued the first of two fatwas declaring war on the United States. In October,
during Congressional hearings, State Department officials gave the first
indications of a change in policy to the Taliban, stating that America now
sought a multi-ethnic, broadly based government in Afghanistan. The
following month, during a visit to a girls’ school in Nasir Bagh refugee
camp, Albright publicly condemned the Taliban’s ‘despicable treatment of
women and their lack of respect for human rights’. 5 Two months later, when
the unocal-sponsored Taliban delegation visited the State Department, no
doubt in anticipation that the usa planned to restore diplomatic relations,
they were lectured on their gender policy and dismissed empty-handed.
It was not until August 1998, in the wake of al-Qa‘ida’s attacks on the
u.s. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, that the State Department took
a harder line with the Taliban. America demanded that Mullah ‘Omar
hand over bin Laden so he could stand trial and launched missile strikes
on al-Qa‘ida bases in Khost and Nangahar. The attacks failed to kill bin
Laden but they marked the end of the rapprochement between the usa
and the Taliban, while unocal withdrew from Afghanistan and shelved
the pipeline project. Mullah ‘Omar was now caught in the middle of a war
between the usa and al-Qa‘ida, unwilling to expel bin Laden but at the
same time the u.s. missile strikes not only violated Afghanistan’s sover-
eignty but were an indirect threat to the Taliban too. When Saudi Arabia
demanded that the Taliban hand over bin Laden, for he was a wanted man
in the Kingdom too, Mullah ‘Omar was in the process of obtaining a legal
opinion from senior religious figures on the issue of bin Laden’s possible
expulsion, although the u.s. State Department appears to have been ignor-
ant of this fact, or chose to ignore it. Shortly before the al-Qa‘ida attacks, a
delegation of senior Saudi officials had visited Kandahar in an attempt to
persuade Mullah ‘Omar to extradite ’Osama bin Laden and the two parties
had established a joint commission of ‘ulama’ to draw up a fatwa legitimiz-
ing his expulsion. In return, the Saudis had pledged hundreds of millions
of dollars in aid once bin Laden was handed over or quit Afghanistan; such
financial assistance was urgently needed, for the Afghan economy was in
dire straits and the country was once more in the grip of famine.
’Osama bin Laden would have been well aware of the Saudis’ activities;
indeed the attacks on the u.s. embassies may well have been designed to
force Mullah ‘Omar into the al-Qa‘ida camp, as bin Laden gambled that the
usa would damn not just him but the Taliban too for supporting terror-
ism. If this were the case, bin Laden’s strategy was a resounding success.
Mullah ‘Omar tried to bargain with America, offering to trade bin Laden’s
extradition for diplomatic recognition of his government and urgent food