afghanistanon American soil, Washington was already gearing up to a massive mili-
tary response and diplomacy was the first casualty. Before General Ahmed
even flew to Kandahar, American officials in Islamabad informed him
that 9/11 had changed everything and ‘there was absolutely no inclination
in Washington to enter into dialogue with the Taliban’. 8 In a speech to
Congress shortly after 9/11, President George W. Bush made it clear that if
the Taliban did not immediately expel bin Laden and his Arab militias and
close down the terrorist bases inside Afghanistan, they would suffer the
same fate as al-Qa‘ida. President Bush then justified the policy of regime
change by mounting a sustained attack on the Taliban’s human rights
record, their gender policies and Islamic credentials. When Mullah Zaeef,
the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, subsequently declared the movement
would never hand over bin Laden and that the Taliban were prepared for
war with the usa, his statement and similar ones by other hardliners were
seen as further justification for toppling the Taliban.
Mullah ‘Omar, however, was in no position to comply with America’s
ultimatum even if he wanted to. He knew bin Laden would not leave
Afghanistan voluntarily, yet he dared not risk a war with the Arab
mujahidin, for bin Laden controlled a heavily fortified series of deep caves
at Tora Bora and if the Taliban attacked the position it would cost them
dearly in terms of casualties and could end in defeat. Furthermore, while
engaged with bin Laden the Northern Alliance might well take advan-
tage of the situation to mount a counterattack. Anyway, many Taliban,
especially those from Sami al-Haq’s network, supported the 9/11 attacks
and might refuse to fight bin Laden. Finally, Mullah ‘Omar was indebted
to bin Laden and his Arab mujahidin for their support during the Soviet
occupation and the campaign against Dostam.
In an attempt to find a way out of this quandary, Mullah ‘Omar called
a second council of ‘ulama’ in the hope that the shura would legitimize
bin Laden’s expulsion. Many of the ‘ulama’ who gathered in Kandahar,
however, sympathized with the radicalism of al-Qa‘ida and regarded bin
Laden as a Muslim hero rather than villain. In the end, all the council did
was to issue a declaration of sorrow and regret for the deaths of 9/11 and
offered to persuade bin Laden to leave voluntarily. The conference also
called on the un and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation to undertake
a judicial investigation into bin Laden’s role in the 9/11 attacks.
Such declarations were never going to satisfy the u.s. administration.
Even before the Kandahar shura convened, the military build-up was
well underway. In early October Wendy J. Chamberlain, America’s new
ambassador to Pakistan, wrote to General Ahmed to ask him to inform