afghanistan
Despite the logistical and technical challenges, the government has
signed a series of mining contracts with local and international com panies
in a process marred by corruption and bribery. In 2007 the China
Metallurgical Group Corporation (mcc) was awarded the contract to
extract copper from the Mes Ainak mine in the Logar in return for annual
royalties that were less than 10 per cent of estimated annual returns. Later
the minister of mines was forced to resign after he was accused of taking
a multimillion-dollar backhander from mcc. In 2015 the government
cited Mes Ainak royalties in its income stream for the ten-year Economic
Self-reliance Plan, but seven years after mcc signed the contract, mining
operations had yet to commence. Mes Ainak today is a major infiltration
route for the Taliban and the whole area is increasingly insecure, despite
the presence of a garrison of 1,500 ana soldiers. Given the lack of security
and Taliban threats against the mining company, any extraction will prob-
ably be delayed for several years, if not abandoned completely. This has not
prevented the government serving eviction orders on six villages in the
Mes Ainak area, without offering compensation or providing alternative
locations for new settlements. Not unexpectedly, the communities have
refused to budge and are now doubtless covertly assisting local insurgents
in order to preserve their lands, homes and livelihood. To date the only
benefit of the Mes Ainak mining project has been the spectacular discovery
of the largest Gandharan Buddhist site ever found in Afghanistan. French
and Afghan archaeologists are now racing against time to excavate and
document scores of religious structures scattered over a large area before
they are bulldozed into extinction.
The crisis of opium productionAnother significant failure of the 2001 intervention was the usa’s inability
to suppress the cultivation of opium and marijuana despite the occasional
deployment of u.s. troops and drones to destroy opium-refining facilities.
Opium production had continued to rise under the Taliban, though in the
final year of their reign they did eradicate most of the opium crop. Once
the new government took power, production once more took off. usaid
and its subcontractors battled to reduce opium cultivation in the Helmand,
Kandahar and Nangahar by introducing cash crops and small-scale indus-
tries, and opening international markets for dried fruit, while the Danish
Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (dacaar) has experimented with
growing saffron. However, no alternative cash crop can match the returns
per hectare realized from opium cultivation. Furthermore, government