conclusionup in wider conflicts in which they are often just bit players. The cost of
these European ventures, however, has been immense suffering and social
dislocation for the inhabitants of the country. In Britain’s case, it provided
the Amirs with the necessary cash and weapons they needed to impose
their will on a reluctant and often recalcitrant people, and was indirectly
responsible for the suffering inflicted on many peoples, including the
Pushtuns whose interests the dynasty claimed to represent.
Afghanistan’s population was never consulted about these policies,
nor were its peoples given a choice as to which nation they wished to be
citizens of. Instead, they were obliged to live in a kingdom with which
many had no historical or ethnic connection, under a government that
denied them representation and was essentially hostile to their interests,
and ruled by a dynasty they regarded as alien. By the time British sur -
veyors had completed their demarcation of the nation state of Afghanistan,
it bore little resemblance to the original Afghanistan of the Mughal and
Safavid era. Indeed, in yet another irony, the modern state did not even
include all of the original Afghanistan, for the Pushtun tribal belt ended
up being partitioned between Afghanistan and India (and subsequently
Pakistan), a situation that created unresolved tensions between the rulers
of Afghanistan and its southern neighbour.
While the nation state of Afghanistan was legitimized by Britain,
Russia and other European powers, its social, religious and governmental
structures bore only a superficial resemblance to European institutions
and remained rooted in archaic, feudal models that served the interests
of one particular clan, ethnicity and Islamic mazhab. This situation has
remained more or less the same to this day, for despite numerous political
upheavals, revolutions and constitutions, Afghanistan is still governed by
tribal and religious cliques with a vested interest in excluding others from
the seat of power. Nor is there much interest in the enfranchisement of
the population as a whole.
Afghanistan’s survival against all the odds is due primarily to the fact
that none of the surrounding powers were prepared to risk outright annex-
ation, for the experience of two Anglo-Afghan Wars made it apparent to
St Petersburg and London that to do so would lead to a long, costly and
unwinnable war. It is a lesson that Western nations have yet to take to heart:
to date every European military intervention in Afghanistan has failed to
achieve its objectives, and more often than not has made matters worse and
created yet more instability. This in turn emphasizes the essential stupidity
of pursuing a military solution to the ‘problem of Afghanistan’, or revisiting
the colonial strategies of the nineteenth century.