THE UMAYYAD REGIME 195there are a number of very important features to be noticed in the
accounts of the fighting found in the chronicles of both sides. For
one thing, pitched battles are very rare and never decisive: the near-
est approach to battles of any significance are the defeat ofVermudo
I (788-791) in 791, and the victory of Ramiro II of Leon over 'Abd
al-Ral].man III at Simancas in 939.^27 The first of these had internal
effects upon the Asturian kingdom, in that it reversed the results of
a disputed succession and led to the probably constrained abdication
of Vermudo and the elevation of Alfonso II (791-842). The second
provided a valuable boost to morale in the Leonese kingdom, and
also determined 'Abd al-Ral].man III never to lead his armies in per-
son again. Neither engagement was in any sense decisive militarily. In
general fighting seems to have been small scale and often with such
unclear results that it is possible to find both sides claiming victory in
their respective historiography. By and large the military response of
the Christian realms took the form of guerrilla activity, to hinder and
harass the raiding armies from the south, and on occasion, as at
Lutos in 794 and at Simancas in 939, this could offer the chance of
a descent upon a negligent and over-confident enemy on the march.
A second distinctive feature of these conflicts is their geographical
limitation. Although occasional raids into the Asturias are recorded,
and Pamplona was sacked in 803 and 843, the Umayyad expeditions
were directed in the greatest number of cases at Alava and Castille.
On some occasions these regions, the western and eastern frontier
zones of the kingdoms of Pam pIon a and the Asturias respectively,
were subjected to annual incursions. These territories were not the
heartlands of the realms to which they belonged, nor did they guard
the sole routes of access to them. It is, however, probable that it was
from the frontier lordships of these regions that most of the smaller-
scale raiding on the Muslim lands to the south was conducted.
A look at the overall picture of the Umayyads' military operations
against the Christian states gives the distinct impression that they
made no attempt to conquer them. This they might have been able
to achieve with only limited difficulty, especially after so many of the
internal problems besetting Al-Andalus were resolved early in the
reign of 'Abd al-Ral].man III. However, not even the impressive and
uniformly successful campaigns of Al-Man~ur, who sacked Barcelona
in 985, Leon in 988 and Santiago in 997, were aimed at such an end.
In every case he withdrew with his troops to Cordoba at the end of
the campaigning season.