lentTurkswouldburstintoatruecheerofjoy,fullofgreedyexpectationsfortheadmirable
thingsthathewouldteachthem.Yeshewouldjoltthemintoaction,wheretheyhadshort-
comings.Andnowthedisappointment!InConstantinoplehewasissuedprintedinstruc-
tions:hehadtobeconsiderate,hadtobecarefulwithhiscritiqueetc.Andtheevenbigger
surpriseindailycontactwiththeTurksthemselves:onlyaversionanddistrust,nothingless
thaningratitudeandnoaspirationtolearnfromtheGermans,butbig-headedhubris,more
thanonecanimagine.Andontopallofthosethings,awkwardsilencehadtobekept.In
lettershome,theTurkswereonlydescribedasinthebooksofthehonorableMisterJäckh,
whichweresimplycanonized[kanonisirt].Ourcensorshipregulatedwiththegreatestanxi-
etythatnounfavorablenewsfromhomereachedusinTurkey.”³¹⁰Inthiscontext,itneedstobepointedoutthattheGermansidedidindeedlearn
frommistakesduringthefirstyearsofthewar.Germansoldierswhohadamili-
tarycriminalrecordwereexcluded:“[U]ndernocircumstances[applicants]who
wereconvictedforinsultingorphysicallymaltreatingothersoldiers[areallowed
toenterOttomanservice].TheTurkscannotbearexcitement,cursingetc.”³¹¹For
thesupervisionoftheOttomanlaborbattalionsalongtheTaurusrailwaycon-
structionsites,onlyseniorGermansergeantswererecruited,whohadenough
lifeexperiencetoendurethiskindofservice.³¹²AccordingtoGeroldvonGleich,
exactlythiscareful pre-selection wasabsolutelyimperative:“Especiallythe
lowerrankswhomwesendtotheOrientareactingabsolutelyprovocative
thereandcontributeconsiderablytoourunpopularityabroad.”³¹³
Goingbacktowhathadbeenstatedbeforeregardingthequarrelsbetween
thestaffofficersofthealliance,itwouldbewrongtooverstatethesedifficulties.
SimilarproblemswerealsoinherentinthecooperationbetweentheGermanand
Austrianmilitary.Onecouldevenstatethatthosewereineluctableconcomitants
ofanycoalitionwarfare.LikeinthecaseoftheOttomanarmy,theGermanHigh
CommandalsorequestedAustriantroopsfortheuseonotherfronts,albeitin
muchsmallernumbers.³¹⁴Regardingthegeneralperformanceofthemultiethnic
imperialforces,intheOttomanandAustriancase,membersoftheGermanGen-
eralStaffmadederogativeremarks,eventhoughthefailureoftheunrealistic
Germanwarplanin 191 4hadcontributedtothefatiguingstalemate.TheGerman
Gleich:“FeldzuginderTürkei1 916 ,”31.
KöniglichBayerischerMilitär-BevollmächtigterBerlintoBavarianMinistryofWar,Munich:
“ÜbertrittintürkischeDienste,” 26 February 1916 .BayHStAIVMKr1958,n.p.
DeputyGeneralCommand1stBavarianArmyCorpstoBavarianMinisterofWar:“Aufsicht-
spersonalfürtürkischeArbeiterbataillone,” 26 April 1916 .BayHStAIVMKr1 954 Nr.6 6936.
Gleich,“FeldzuginderTürkei,” 57.
WolfgangEtschmann,“Österreich-UngarnzwischenEngagementundZurückhaltung:K.
u.k.TruppenanderWestfront,”inKriegsende1918:Ereignis,Wirkung,Nachwirkung.,ed.Jörg
DupplerandGerhardP.Groß(Munich:Oldenbourg,1999), 97 – 105.
ChallengestoCoalitionWarfare 95