withtheirOttomanallies,whichweremoreboundtotheirchainofcommand.
However,thisalsohadclearlydisadvantages,sinceitoftencaused clashes
amongtheofficersofthealliance.³¹⁹TheGermanmembersofthemilitarymis-
sionhadswornanoathtotheKaiser,butservedintheSultan’sarmyonthebasis
ofaprivatecontractwiththeOttomanstate.
ManyGermansratedtheOttomanfrontsasan‘inferior’theatreofwar.³²⁰In
theperceptionofmostGermanofficers,theʻreal’wartookplaceinCentralEu-
rope.TheGermanconsulinDamascus,Löytved-Hardegg,complainedaboutthe
Germanofficers’behaviorinSyria.Fromtheconsul’sview,thosemenhadbeen
chosenwrongly:
“AlotofthegentlementhataresentherehaveservedinAfricainthecolonies,withthe
erroneousassumptionthatthosemenwouldadapttothelocalaffairsfaster.Infactthis
hasnotbeenthecasewithmostofthembecausetheywereusedtoconsortlikelords
withslaves,andtheyalsowantedtoapplythoseconsortcustomshere.”³²¹ThisledtotensionswiththeOttomanofficersandthelocalcivilpopulation.Löy-
tved-HardeggpleadedfortheapplicationofBritishlessonsfromEgypt.TheGer-
mandirectwayofcommunicationwouldresultinOttomanpassiveresistance.
OnlyasmallnumberofGermanswasskilledenoughtoconniveatthoseprob-
lemsandworkforthebetter.InreferencetohisBritishsourceforLöytved-Har-
degg“theGermanofficer[...]mustbeamanofhighcharacter”andshouldpos-
sessthefollowingrequirements:
“sufficientelasticityofmindtobeabletoapply,undercircumstanceswhicharestrangeto
him,theknowledgewhichhehasacquiredelsewhere.Hemustbeinpossessionofsound
judgmentinordertoenablehimtodistinguishbetweenabuses,whichshouldbeatonce
reformed,andthose,whichitwillbewisetotolerate,atalleventsforatime.Hemust
beversatile,andquicktoadaptanylocalfeatureoftheadministrationtosuithisreforming
purposes.”³²²ThiswartimetransferofknowledgeofcolonialpracticesfromtheBritishtothe
Germansideishighlyremarkable.ItisevenmoreinterestingtonotethattheOt-
tomanstatehadintendedsomethingsimilarbeforethewar.Inearly 1912 ,theOt-
tomanarmyhadrequestedtosendseveraloftheirofficerstothemilitarydepart-
Trumpener,GermanyandtheOttomanEmpire,7 2 – 73.
EspeciallyinthecaseofGeneralFalkenhayn;HolgerAfflerbach,Falkenhayn:Politisches
DenkenundHandelnimKaiserreich(Munich:Oldenbourg,1994), 47 1.
NavalattachéHumanntotheReichs-Marine-Amt,15December 1916 ;BA-MARM3/ 2964 ,1 74.
EvelynBaringEarlofCromer,ModernEgypt(NewYork:Macmillan,1908), 28 0etseq.
AskariandAsker:TheOttomanEmpireandColonialWarfare 97