The \'German Spirit\' in the Ottoman and Turkish Army, 1908-1938. A History of Military Knowledge Transfer - Gerhard Grüßhaber

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Conclusions


ThedecadeaftertheYoungTurkrevolutionwascharacterizedbyatremendous
increaseofGermanassistancefortheOttomanarmy.Inordertopreservetheex-
istenceoftheprospectiveally,Germanycommitteditselftotherecoveryofthe
Ottomanmilitarystrength.Nevertheless,thecomparisonwiththeChileanexam-
pledemonstratesthattheOttomanarmyhadquitedifferentexpectationsregard-
ingthechoiceofGermanmilitaryknowledge.IntheOttomancase,thearmy
mainlyservedthepacificationandthestabilizationofinternalrule,whereas
theuseofmilitaryforceasaninstrumentofforeignpolicywasofsecondaryim-
portance.ThankstotheuseoftheGermanmilitaryattachéandGeneralvonder
Goltz,theGermanarmywasabletorestoreitsdominatingrolewithintheOtto-
manarmy,whichalsopaidoffwithregardtoOttomanarmamentordersfrom
GermanyinsteadoftheFrenchcompetitor.Furthermore,sendingOttomanoffi-
cerstoGermanywastobethemostimportantcornerstoneoftheGerman-Otto-
mancollaboration.IntheGermanmilitaryenvironment,Ottomanofficersunder-
stoodthenecessityforareformoftheOttomanarmyfollowingtheGermanrole
model,thoughsomeelementsoftheGermanmilitaryculturewererejected.In
somecases,OttomanofficersevenadaptedGermanmilitaryhabits.
Inthechoicefortheheadofthemilitarymission,theGermansidemadeno
gooddecisionalthoughithelpedraisetheleveloftheOttomanmilitarycapaci-
ties.However,ithastobestatedthatmostofthetraining,thechoiceoftactical
measuresandtheconductofoperationsremainedwithinOttomanresponsibili-
ty.TheOttomanarmymadesureitstayedincommandofitsforcesasduringthe
FirstWorldWarespecially,theGermanmilitarymissiontriedtoextenditsinflu-
ence.Thusoneoftheproblemsofcoalitionwarfarebetween 191 4and 1918 was
thestrugglefortheGermandecisiveroleoverOttomanstrategy.Asinthecaseof
theBalkanWars,GermanyprovidedassistanceinthedefenseoftheOttomanter-
ritory.YetthishelpwastohaveapriceintheformofOttomancommitmenttothe
waragainstRussia.Byorientingitselfaroundthe‘Germanwayofwar’,theOtto-
manleadershipwasalsoimitatingtheprincipalfaultoftheGermanwarfare,
namely,theneglectofthelogisticandeconomicconsequencesofamultiform
conflict.³³⁵
Inallthesecampaigns,bothalliescollectedplentyofexperiences,which
wereevaluatedafterthewar,atopicthatwillbedealtwithinmoreattention


EricksonandUyar,AMilitaryHistoryoftheOttomans,2 78 ;GerhardPaulGroß,Mythosund
Wirklichkeit:GeschichtedesoperativenDenkensimdeutschenHeervonMoltked.Ä.bisHeusinger
(Paderborn:Schöningh, 2012 ), 103.


Conclusions 101
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