CoalitionWarfareunderAssessment
IntheGermanmilitarypress,mostwartimeshortcomingsoftheGermanarmy
werediscussedcritically.Thelackofprewarpreparationandsupplymanage-
mentaswellasthenumerouslongfrontswerefrequenttopics.Addingtothat
criticismofthereluctantalliesdominatedtheevaluations,withafocusonthe
cooperationwithAustro-HungaryandtheunexpectedItalianwithdrawalfrom
thewaralongsidetheCentralPowers.¹⁰IntherarereferencestotheOttoman
case,thiswasoftenrelatedtothedecisionsofthepolicymakerEnverPasha,
whowasregardedasunqualified,andthehighOttomandesertionrate,even
thoughinthelattercase,theGermanarmyhadsufferedfromthesameproblem
duringthelastyearofthewar.¹¹Ontheotherhand,theTurkishsidecarefully
analyzedthebitterlessonsofthealliance.In 1935 ,theGermanophileCaptain
AsımErenstressedtheneedforTurkishpoliticstotakesidesinafutureconflict.
Thearmywastoacceptthealliancedecisionsofthepoliticians.However,the
disasterof 1912 hadshowntheneedtopreparethearmyforenteringawarwith-
outanally.ForEren,theGermanpoliticaldecisionmakershadmadeasimilar
mistakein 191 4,eventhoughGermanycouldcountonseveralallies.Erenthen
adoptedtheviewoftheGermanmilitaryeliteandblamedtheGermanpoliticians
forthepoorpreparationforconflictandthebadoutcomeofthewar.Themain
sourceforhisargumentswerequotesfromthememoirsofFieldMarshalHinden-
burg.ForEren,warfarewasnottoberestrictedtopoliticallimitationsand
dreams.ThishadbecomeevidentinthenegativeoutcomeoftheOttomancam-
paignsintheCaucasusandIran,whilsttheSyrianfrontwasclosetocollapse.¹²
Basedontheseconsiderations,Erenstressedtheneednottototallytrusttheally,
keepinginmindtheally’snaturalself-interestandhisweaknesses,whichwould
alsoeffectitssituationinwar.¹³Regardingtheally’sdubioustrustworthiness,
Erenmentionedthecaseofthebreak-upoftheBalkanLeaguein 1913 duetoun-
resolvedterritorialdisputes.Sinceeachpartnerinthealliancehaditsowninter-
estsatheart,Turkeywastobeequallyselfish.Inordertoprovideanegativeex-
amplefor neglectoftheownpoliticalinterests,ErenquotedHindenburg’s
statementthatEnverPasha’spolicytowardsGermanyhadbeenclosetoself-de-
EveninamajormonographontheGeneralstafftheOttomancommandwasnotpartofthe
evaluations;seeWolfgangFoerster,AusderGedankenwerkstattdesDeutschenGeneralstabes
(Berlin:Mittler,1 93 1).
Haller,Militärzeitschriften,2 97 – 301 ,3 10 – 311.
AsımEren,“AskerîAndlaşmalar(İttifaklar)NasıldırveNasılOlmalıdır?”[WhatareMilitary
Treaties(Alliances)andHowdotheyHavetobe?],AM6( 19 35),4 19 – 42 0.
Eren,“AskerîAndlaşmalar,” 42 1.
164 4German-TurkishMilitaryCooperationafter 1918