Inthesubsequentyears,theTurkishmilitarypresstookamorenationalap-
proachtomilitaryhistorywithoutexcludingitsEuropeansources.TheAskerî
Mecmua’ssupplement(AskerîMecmua’nınTarihKısmı;AMTK)becameaplat-
form for works on (late)Ottomancampaigns andthe Graeco-Turkishwar.
Therewereseveralstudiesonthe‘classical’Ottomancampaignsofthepast.³²
Otherinquiriescontainedreferencestocontemporaryissuessuchasthecounter-
insurgencystrategiesappliedbytheOttomanmilitary.³³Inaddition,thebranch
specificperiodicalsalsopublishedarticlesrelatedtothe‘national’historyofthe
military.³⁴
Thereweretworeasonsforthisappealtonationalvirtuesandpractices.On
theonehand,theywerepartofthenationalprideafterthevictoryoverGreecein
1922 andthewithdrawalofthevictorypower’soccupationforce.Botheventshad
helpedtoforgetthehumiliatingdefeatintheWorldWar.Ontheotherhand,
however,thispridealsomusthavebeenrelatedtothesomehowarrogantap-
proachofmanyGermanauthors.TheyhadtriedtoassociatetheGermanefforts
between 191 4and 1918 withtheTurkishvictoryin 19 22,basedontheintentto
diminishtheOttoman/Turkish share.It shouldbenotedatthis pointthat
thesethoughtswerenotopenlyracist,asindicatedbyEricksonandUyar.³⁵Nev-
ertheless,officialTurkishmilitaryhistorywritingintheearlyrepublicwasdefi-
nitelyrootedinthefeeling“[...]ofinsecuritytowardtheWest,ifnotafull-blown
inferioritycomplex.”³⁶
Ingeneral,thecontributionoftheOttomanarmytothecourseofthewar
wasseenasimportant,sincetheOttomanforceshadundeniablykeptaway
enemytroopsfromtheGermanfronts.WithoutthehighconcentrationoftheEn-
tenteintheEasternMediterraneanregion,Germanywouldhavefaceditsown
GallipoliinvasioninPomerania.³⁷YetGermanleadershipskillswereratedhigher
thantheOttomancommander’sabilitiesinmostofthearticlespublishedinthe
Germanmilitarypress.WithouttherevivaloftheOttomanmilitarystrengthafter
thedefeatof 1912 /1 3 “KemalAtatürkbarelywouldhavebeenabletoconducthis
TheoccupationofCrete:ŞükûnandZiya,“GiritSeferiMart 164 5-Eylül 166 9,”AMTK(19 33 )
andthesecondsiegeofVienna:AlâettinandCavit,“İkinciViyanaMuhaberesi 168 3,”AMTK
(19 33 ).
HerereferingtotheGreekrebellion;FahrettinandSeyfi,“ 1820 – 1827 Moraİsyanı,”AMTK
(1934).
TheOttomanakıncıcavalryasasourceofinspirationforthemodernTurkishcavalryin
NamiMalkoç,“Akınlar,AkıncılarveBüyükAkınlar,”SM 12 – 97 (1936), 68 – 89.
EricksonandUyar,MilitaryHistory,2 79.
Sencer,OrderandInsecurityinGermanyandTurkey,25.
OttoWelsch,“ZumzehntenJahrestagedertürkischenKriegserklärung,”MWB 109 – 26
(19 25 ),cols.7 56 – 75 9.
168 4German-TurkishMilitaryCooperationafter 1918