piecemealbuildingprogramespeciallyattheFrenchAtlanticcoast.Therehad
beencontinuousargumentsbetweenthearmy,navyandtheparamilitarycon-
structioncorpsOrganisationTodt,whichwasresponsibleforbuildingmassive
bunkers.Earlierwarningsregardingtheenemy’smistakesintheplanningof
the 1915 invasion,namely,that“ʻtoomanycooksspoilthebroth’,andwhatis
theresultof‘amateurstrategists’exercisingadecisiveinfluenceonthesupreme
conductofwar”¹¹²wereneglectedinthiscase.Regardingtheconstructionof
beachdefences,thedescriptiongivenbyCarlMühlmannontheOttomanmeas-
uresalsoappliedtoFrance:
“Machinegunsandsinglecanons,arrangedtobeinvisiblefromthesea,coveredtheshore
strips.Behindthefirsttrenchwereinfantrystrongpointswithinmutualfiringrange.Bar-
bed-wireobstaclessunkintotheshallowwateratsinglepositionswereintendedtokeep
thelandingenemywithinshootingrange,anti-personnelminesweretoinflictcasualties
whentheenemywentashore.Inordertoenablethetroopstomaintaintheircoastalposi-
tionsforlongertimeandtobeindependentfromsupplies,everywheresmallammunition
andfooddepotswereerected.Medicalcarefacilitieswerenotneglected.”¹¹³However,justlikein1 915 ,Germanestimationsofapossiblealliedinvasionzone
hadbeenwrongandtheAlliesdidtheirbesttoconcealtheiroperationalplans.
InthecaseoftheAtlantikwall,thewholeFrenchcoastlinehadtobedefended,
andthisresultedinatotalfragmentationoftheGermandefenceforces.Theob-
staclesonthebeachcouldnotpreventthelandingofenemyforces.Eventhe
mostadvantageoustimeforalandingwasmiscalculated:
“Theenemyinvasionwashinderedmorebycoastalfieldobstacles(hedgehogs,dragons’
teeth,pile-driverrafts,underwatermines,rollmines,etc.),theconstructionofwhichsuf-
fered,however,fromlackofexperiencedmenandmaterials;whichinthebeginning,
werebuiltundertheassumptionthattheinvasionwouldbemadeattidetimeonly.”¹¹⁴OttoWelsch,“DasGallipoliwunderoderdieSchlachtderverpaßtenChancen,”Wissenund
Wehr7( 19 35), 74 – 76 ,95.RegardingHitler’signoranceinthefaceofapossibleAlliedinvasionin
March1 944 seeAndreasHillgruber,StaatsmännerundDiplomatenbeiHitler:VertraulicheAuf-
zeichnungenüberUnterredungenmitVertreterndesAuslandes.Vol.2: 1942 – 1944 (Frankfurt
amMain:Bernard&Graefe, 1970 ), 390.
Mühlmann,KampfumdieDardanellen,86.Unfortunately,the 194 3reportofadelegation
visitoftheTurkishGeneralStafftoasectionoftheAtlantikwallinNorthernFrance,could
notbetracedintheATASEarchives.ForthejourneyseeRıfatN.Bali,“OrduKomutanıOrgeneral
CemilCahitToydemirʼinAlmanyaGezisi:HitlerileGörüşme”[TheGermanyTourofGeneral
CemilCahitToydemir:MeetingwithHitler],ToplumsalTarih 16 5( 2007 ), 38 – 42 andfigure 9
above.
FritzZiegelmann, 35 2nd[German]InfantryDivision.SpecialQuestions(Normandy),US
NARAHDB- 02 1, 1946 ,4.
FromGallipolitoOverlord:FailedApplicationinOccupiedFrance, 1940 – 1944 185