TheGermanHighCommandwasawarethat,aftertheexperienceinGallipoli,a
quickvictorywithinthefirstdaysoftheinvasionwasessential:“Theguiding
principlewasthattheenemymustbedefeatedonthebeacheswithinthreeor
fourdaysaftertheinitiallanding.Ifthisfailed,allwouldbelost.”¹¹⁵
FortheGermanstaffofficersitwasobviousthattheGermandefensiveforces
hadlackedunifiedcommandsimilartotheonetheAlliedinvasionarmyhad
possessedin 1915 .¹¹⁶AfterfouryearsofwartheGermannavycouldnotassist
inthedefenseofthecoastline.TheGermanairforcewasunderstrengthinthe
summerof 1944 .Ontheground,likeintheOttomancaseinthepast,duetopro-
ductionshortages,notalloftheGermanshorebatterieswereequippedproperly
Figure9:ColonelSalihErkuşandGeneralCemilCahitToydemir(inlightuniforms,fromleft)with
athirdmemberoftheTurkishGeneralStaffʼsdelegationonavisitataGermanAtlantikwall
section,probablyLeTouquet,June 1943
MaxPemsel,PreparationsforInvasion.Forewordby[U.S.]CaptainGeorgeBlanchard,US
NARAHDB- 23 4, 1946 ,3.Seealsothe 194 1orderCf.the 194 1WehrmachtHighCommand
orderforanearlypreventionofanyenemylandingattemptinRudiRolf,DerAtlantikwall:
DieBautenderdeutschenKüstenbefestigungen, 19401945 (Osnabrück:Biblio,1998),82.
LeoGeyrvonSchweppenburg,TheTheorybehindTroopDispositionsinFrance.Commentary
toSpeidel,Hans:Rommel’sViews(1Apr.-May1944),USNARAHDB- 72 0, 194 7,11.
186 4German-TurkishMilitaryCooperationafter 1918