todefendfastmovingenemywatercraft.¹¹⁷Moreover,thequalityoftheGermans
troopshaddeteriorateddramaticallyby1 944 .TheGermanbunkertroopsandthe
reservetroopsinthehinterlandwerenotnewlydraftedastheOttomanunits,
whichhadalreadyservedapproximatelyfivemonthsin 1915 .MostoftheWehr-
machtandKriegsmarinegarrisontroopsconsistedofWorldWarOneveterans,
mostofthemunfitforservice,andyoungandinexperiencedsoldiers:“Tome,
asanoldsoldierwhohaspassedthroughthefirstWorldWar,actingasabattery-
andbattalioncommanderintheartillery,itseemedasiftheseyoungsoldiers
couldnotstandtheartilleryfireoftheenemyaseasilyasthosewhohad
takenpartinthefirstWorldWar.”¹¹⁸
TheProgressofMilitaryTechnologysinceGallipoli
ThedisasteroftheGallipolicampaignwasstudiedextensivelybytheRoyalNavy
andlatertheUSNavyaswellastheUSMarineCorps.TheBritishNavyhadde-
velopedaninstructionmanualforcombinedarmyandnavyoperations,also
usingthe 1915 experiencesbeforeanythingcomparablewasundertakenbythe
Germanarmedforces.Furthermore,theaccuracyofnavalartillerywasimproved
toincreasethedamageofenemyshorebatteries.TheRoyalNavyalsodeveloped
anewgenerationofarmoredlandingshipsthatofferedenhancedprotectionfor
thelandingpartyunderenemyfire.¹¹⁹TheUSNavyalsoshowedconsiderablein-
terestinthebattleforthestraits,eventhoughtheUnitedStateshadnotpartici-
patedinthisoperationduetotheirlateentryintoWorldWarOne.ThefirstEng-
lishtranslationofLimanvonSanders’memoirswaspublishedbytheNaval
InstitutePressin 1927 .Togetherwithotheroperations,especiallybyJapan,the
mainprospectiveUSadversaryinthelate 19 30s,Gallipoliservedasoneofthe
modelsforthedevelopmentofamodernUSNavylandingdoctrine.¹²⁰
InthespecialsituationoftheGermanoccupationofFrance,thedivided
commandoftheGermanWehrmachtandKriegsmarineplayedintothehands
oftheAlliedplanning.UnliketheOttmantroopsatGallipoli,theGermantroops
defendedforeignsoilandweretheoccupiers.Alliedmilitaryintelligencemade
useoftheFrenchRésistancemovementinthecampaign,anadvantagetheEn-
ErnstGoettke,CoastArtillery-AtlanticWall,USNARAHDB- 66 3, 194 7,22.
GerhardTriepel,FightingontheCotentinPeninsula,withSpecialReferencetotheCoastAr-
tillery:CotentinArtillery(6– 18 Jun.1944),USNARAHDB- 26 0, 1946 ,10.
IanSpeller,“IntheShadowofGallipoli?AmphibiousWarfareintheInterwarPeriod,”in
Gallipoli:MakingHistory,ed.JennyMacleod(London,NewYork:FrankCass,2004), 141 – 14 2.
Speller,“IntheshadowofGallipoli,” 14 6.
TheProgressofMilitaryTechnologysinceGallipoli 187