tentecouldnotenjoybackin 1915 .¹²¹Itisalsointerestingtonotethatmostofthe
ordnancesystemsandsmallarms(regardingthebolt-actionrifles,namely,the
BritishSMLEandtheGermanMausersystem)wereusedinbothcampaigns.¹²²
Despitethesesimilarities,militaryreconnaissancetechnologyhadundergone
rapiddevelopmentbetweenthewars.WhilethestateofOttomanfortification
workshadbeenuncertainfortheEntentein1 915 ,theAllieshadhigh-resolution
photographsoftheGermandefencesattheirdisposalin 1944 .Preparationson
boththeAlliedandGerman sidestookmuchlonger andweretechnically
moresophisticatedthanatthebeginningoftheFirstWorldWar.Inaddition
tothearmoredlandingships,amphibioustankshadbeenbuiltespeciallyfor
thisoperationtosupportthelandedinfantry.Finally,thelandedAlliedinfantry
unitsweremuchmorespecializedin assaulttechniquesthantheirBritish,
FrenchandANZACpredecessorshadbeen.¹²³
Thepreparationsfor‘OperationOverlord’hadbeenamixtureofoldand
newtactics,technologiesandweapons.Inthisregarditwasa“successfulGalli-
poliduetobetterplanningandshorterdistances.”¹²⁴
DisprovaloftheGermanDoctrineduringthe
‘ThelongestDay’
Thedivergingideasofcoastaldefenseprovedtobeabigobstacletothedefense
ofNormandyshores.AdmiralTheodorKranckecomplainedabouttheWehr-
macht’swrongdoctrine,clearlydrawnfromHansWehrle’sflexibledefense:
“Theapparentlycomplicatedorganizationofthecoastaldefensewaspreconditionedbythe
attitudeoftheArmywhoseideasweremainlydirectedtowardtheconceptionoflandwar-
fare.Thefiringagainstquicklymovableseatargetsrequires,however,methodsoffiring,
andformationsofBatteriesthataredifferentfromthoseforlandbattle.TheHeerwasac-
customedtofireindirectlyfromcoveredgunpositionsanddidnotconsiderthelocationof
the[Navyʼs]coastalbatteriesneartotheshorefordirectfiringtobeasolutionforcedonus
bynewconditionsbutregardedtheideaasobsolete.ButwhenfightingtookplaceagainstRobinHigham,“WeaponsOldandWeaponsNew:TechnologyatD-Day,”inSeemachtund
Geschichte:Festschriftzum80.GeburtstagvonFriedrichRunge,ed.DeutschesMarine-Institut
(Bonn,BadGodesberg:MOV, 1975 ), 130.
Higham,“WeaponsOldandWeaponsNew,” 131.
PeterChasseaud,“ComparisonwithD-Day, 1944 ,”inGraspingGallipoli.Terrain,Mapsand
FailureattheDardanelles,1 915 (Staplehurst:Spellmount,2005), 265 – 26 9.SeealsoRupert
Hamer,“D-DayinNormandyandSuvlaBay,”Sabertache 39 (1998), 3 – 9.
Higham,“WeaponsOldandWeaponsNew,” 12 3.
188 4German-TurkishMilitaryCooperationafter 1918