The \'German Spirit\' in the Ottoman and Turkish Army, 1908-1938. A History of Military Knowledge Transfer - Gerhard Grüßhaber

nation-buildingproject.¹⁹¹ThisstatementalsoindicatedMustafaKemalpointing
tothethirdtaskfortheTurkisharmedforces,namely,thedefenseagainstexter-
nalthreats.Thearmy’soverallsizewasincreasedagaininthe 19 30s.Itreached
12 0,0 00 meninarmsin 1936 withamobilizationplanfrom 1938 fordrafting
1, 300 ,0 00 menintotal,thatis, 65 percentofallmeneligibleformilitaryserv-
ice.¹⁹²However,themanpoweroftheTurkisharmydidnotequalitscombat
strength.Thestatebudgetwasnotsufficienttofundamodernequipped,motor-
izedandmechanizedforce,supportedbyastrongairforceandnavy.Inaddition,
ontheeveofWorldWarTwo,theTurkishmilitaryproductionfacilitiescouldnot
fulfilltheneedsofamoderntotalwar.Therefore,thearmycouldsolelyserveto
deterpotentialinvasion.Forthistask,theTurkishmilitaryleadershipsoughtthe
assistanceofGermaninstructors.

CommonInterests

TheTurkishofficercorpswasdominatedbyOttomanveterans,whohadlived
throughaturbulentdecade.Theyweretaskedwithmoldingtheyoungleaders
oftheRepublicanarmy:“Theyhadcomefromtheempireandbelievedthat
theyhadhelpedtoestablishtherepublic.Thisgenerationhaddonethe 1908 rev-
olution.[...]ThiswasthegenerationoftheEnvers,theAtatürks,theİsmets.”¹⁹³
Inthisregardtheirconsiderationsweresimilartotheratherpragmaticview
ofsomeoftheirGermaninstructors.AfterthefalloftheGermanmonarchy,Gen-
eralMittelbergerwasengulfedindoubtoverhisabilitytoembracetheRepubli-
canspirit.Nonetheless,MittelbergerdecidedtojointheReichswehroutofideo-
logicalconvictionsincehefavoredtheruleofPresidentHindenburg:

“[...][W]ithoutanarmy[Wehrmacht]drivenbymoralvaluesanddiscipline,thereconstruc-

tionofahealthyempire[Reich]wasnotpossible.[...]Thesoldiermustnotserveaparty,but

hastobetheservantofthewholenation.HehastoaccepttheRepublic,buthecouldnot

beapoliticalsoldierinthesenseofbasingthefulfillmentofhisdutiesonapartyprogram.

Ahealthyarmyrepresentsthestate’sauthority.ThiswasthecaseinImperialGermanyand

ithadtobelikethatintheRepublic.[...]Essentialwasthecoreandnottheoutershelland

thecore,likeineveryserviceablearmy,consistedoftheselflessfulfillmentofdutiesand

ForthemilitaristdiscourseintheearlyrepublicseealsoAltınay,TheMythoftheMilitary-
Nation,2 7 – 30.
Tekeliandİlkin,İkinciDünyaSavaşıTürkiyesi,97, 106 ,1 17 ;Akyaz,AskerîMüdahalelerinOr-
duyaEtkisi,39.
AdnanÇelikoğlu,BirDarbeciSubayınAnıları:27MayısÖncesiveSonrasıMemoirsofa
PutschistOfficer:BeforeandafterMay27( 196 0), 23.

204 4German-TurkishMilitaryCooperationafter 1918