armoredvehicles,withthisbranchofarmsineverycombataspect,wewillemergevicto-
riouswithhistoricalsignificance.”²⁹⁷TheContemporaryArmamentTrendtowardsMechanization
andtheTurkish(Armored)Cavalry
Motorizationreferstothepartialequipmentoftheinfantryorcavalryunitswith
motorvehiclesasamainmeansoftransportation.Mechanizationmeansthatthe
entirefightingpoweroftheunitrestsonthemotor,thatis,ontheuseofarm-
ouredcarsandtanks.DuetotherestrictionsoftheVersaillesTreaty,Germany
hadnotanksandarmoredvehiclesinitsarsenalandtheReichswehrhadadis-
proportionatelyhighnumberofcavalryunits.Nevertheless,theGermansused
theopportunitytotrainanablestaffofofficersandsoldierswithinthemounted
unitsforthefutureusewithintheproposedarmoredcorps.Preparationsbegan
thankstothecooperationwiththeSovietarmyinthelate 1920 s.²⁹⁸Yetthe
ReichswehrwasnotarolemodelforTurkeyinthefieldofamodernmotorized
armywithastrongtankforce.TurkishofficersalsolookedtotheFrenchmilitary
pressforinspiration.AlthoughintheFrencharmythemotorizationofthecav-
alryhadgainedpriorityintheearly1 93 0s,thispolicyhadbeenrestrictedbe-
causeofbudgetcuts.AccordingtoFrenchanalysts,thecavalrybound too
manysoldiersfortaskssuchasguardinghorsesduringcombat.Asaconse-
quence,cavalrysquadronsrequiredmorestrengthtoreachthesamefirepower
asamotorizedinfantryunitofcomparablesize.ContrarytotheTurkishview,
thecavalrywasevenseenasoutdatedbysomeFrenchdebaters.²⁹⁹Nonethelss,
thecavalryremainedanimportantarmybranch,resultinginthecreationofsix
partiallymotorizedlightcavalrydivisions(divisionlégèredecavalerie)andtwo
armoreddivisionslégèresmécaniquespriorto 1939 .However,theywerenota
matchfor theGermantankdivisionsinthefollowingyear.³⁰⁰The German
M.RahmiSanalan,“BüyükHarbveİstiklâlHarbinde,TürkOrdusuİçin,SüvariKullanılma-
sındanAlınanDersler”[LessonsfortheTurkishArmyfortheUseofCavalrydrawnfromthe
GreatWarandtheWarofIndependence],AM 55 – 105 (19 37 ),311.
KlausRichter,DiefeldgrauenReiter:DieberittenenundbespanntenTruppeninReichswehr
undWehrmacht(Stuttgart:Motorbuch,1986), 84 – 86.
Pierre-HenriDelorge,“PourquoiAvoirGardéUneCavalerieàCheval( 1918 – 19 39)?,”Guerres
MondialesetConflitsContemporains 22 5( 2007 ), 27 ,2 9 – 30.
DanielMarcSegesser,“NurkeineDummheiten:DasfranzösischeOffizierskorpsunddas
KonzeptdestotalenKrieges,”inAnderSchwellezumTotalenKrieg:DiemilitärischeDebatte
überdenKriegderZukunft, 1919 – 1939 ,ed.StigFörster(Paderborn:FerdinandSchöningh,
2002 ), 136 – 137.
228 4German-TurkishMilitaryCooperationafter 1918