TheOttomanvulnerabilityinthedefeatsagainstItalyandtheBalkanLeague
between 1911 and 1913 hadhighlightedtheneedforadrasticmilitaryreform.
However,timewasshortfortheGermanmilitarymissionunderGeneralOtto
LimanvonSanders,whichwasacceptedbytheOttomanarmyinlate 1913 .Be-
sidesthosedevelopmentstheresourcesoftheagrarianOttomanstatewerelim-
ited,leavingnoroomforabuild-upofarmsinthescaleoftheCentralEuropean
armiesatthattime.Germany,the 64 millionstateinthemiddleofEurope,witha
peacetimeforcelevelof 76 1, 000 soldiersbetween 191 4and 1918 wasabletomo-
bilizeabout 11 millionmenintotal.Bycontrast,theperipheralOttomanstate–
whichalsofacedawaronseveralfrontswithapopulationof 23 millionpeople
andapeacetimestrengthof 20 0,0 00 soldiersbefore 191 4wasabletofield
around3millionsoldiersintotalduringtheFirstWorldWar.⁹¹Yettheconditions
fortheOttomanconductofwardifferedconsiderablyfromtheGermanrole
model,whichgeneratedconsiderablefrictionintheGerman-Ottomanalliance,
thelattersignedon2August 191 4.Thereafter,theGermanmilitarymission
wastoplayanimportantroleintheconductofOttomanwarfare.Thanksto
themobilizationofallresourcesandthecontributionsoftheGermanarmy,
theOttomanswereabletodeteranAlliedinvasionattemptinÇanakkale(Galli-
poli),thusraisingOttomanconfidenceofwinningthiswar.Thisbeingthecase
theOttomanarmyfacedserioussetbacksattheothersfronts,andanintermedi-
atesuccessagainsttheBritishforcesinIraqdissipatedquickly.Withintheframe-
workofitsallianceobligationstheOttomanarmyalsoprovidedtroopsforthe
EastEuropeantheatersofwar,aftertheenemypressureontheOttomanmain-
landhadleveredin 1916 .Inthelongterm,theCentralPowerscouldnotcope
withtheenemy’ssuperiority,andthefinalmilitarycollapseoftheGerman
andOttomanforcescameintoeffectnearlysimultaneously.
BothcountriessharedtheburdenofthetreatiesofVersaillesandSèvresre-
spectively.WhereastheTurkish nationalistmovementunderMustafaKemal
AtatürkwasabletopreventthepartitionoftheAnatolianmainlandandforce
thevictorypowerstorenegotiatethepeacetermsinLausannein 1923 ,inGerma-
nytheangeroverpartialoccupationandheteronomy,alsoinmilitaryaffairs,
contributedtothegrowthofthepoliticalright.Inthoseinterwaryears,theGer-
man-Ottomanmilitarycooperation,interruptedbytheoutcomeofthewar,con-
tinued.AlthoughtheTurkishsidehadlearnedtheirlessons,andtheGerman
ErikJanZürcher,“TheBalkanWarsandtheRefugeeLeadershipoftheearlyTurkishRepublic,”
inWarandNationalism:TheBalkanWars, 1912 – 191 3andTheirSociopoliticalImplications,ed.
HakanM.YavuzandIsaBlumi(SaltLakeCity:UniversityofUtahPress, 20 13), 665 – 67 8.
BrunoThoss,“Truppenstärken,”inEnzyklopädieErsterWeltkrieg,ed.G.Hirschfeld,G.Kru-
meichandI.Renz(Paderborn:Schöningh, 20 09), 92 8.
TheYoungTurkPeriod, 1908 – 1938 21