oftheprogram.ButtherewerealsofinanciallimitsoftheOttomanarmy,as
Strempelnoted:
“[T]hefinancialsituationofTurkeydoesnotallowtosendsomanyofficerstoGermanyin
ordertoawaketheunderstandingofthecharacterofamodernarmythatmightbecome
commonknowledgeofall[officers].MostprobablywithsuchafloodbyTurkishofficers
inGermanynoone’sinterestwouldbeserved.”⁸²Thereforeherealsoarisesthequestionifthistrainingwasseenasappropriate,
oriftherewereconcerns.Thereseemtohavebeensomeproblems,sincetheGer-
manambassadorWangenheimnotedin1912:
“Accordingtomynon-authoritativelaymen’sopinion,ratherthantrainingTurkishofficers
andrankandfiles[intheOttomanEmpire,G.G.]accordingtoGermanfieldregulations,itis
importantthattalentedTurkishofficerswillbetrainedasinstructorsherewithus,inorder
totransfertheGermanlessons[Lehren]intotheTurkishSpirit[türkischenGeist]andmake
themunderstandabletotheirsubordinates.”⁸³InthefollowingitwillbecomeevidentthatthistransferofGermanlessonstothe
“TurkishSpirit”waseasiersaidthandone,althoughitexactlyservedtheidea
proposedbyWangenheim.Asaresult,timespentinGermanyofferedtheOtto-
mansawiderangeofknowledgethatcouldbeappliedintheOttomanarmy.
TheGermanWayofSoldieringintheEyes
oftheOttomanOfficers
TheGermanarmy’sprestigehadcreatedgreatimpressionontheOttomansol-
diersevenbeforetheyhadarrivedintheGermangarrisons.NearlyeveryOtto-
manofficersufferedaculturalshock,comingfromanagrarianstateintoacoun-
tryattheheightofitsindustrialization.WritingabouthistimeinKarlsruhe,Cafer
al-Askarinotednotedthathewasoverwhelmedbyunknownimpressions:“Ger-
manefficiency,earnestnessandindustrymadeanimmediateimpactuponus.
[...]Iwasfound[sic]myselfinamilitaryenvironmentintotalcontrasttowhat
IhadbeenusedtointheOttomanarmy.Everythingwasnewtome.”⁸⁴
MilitärberichtNr 28 7,dated 28 May1 910 ,2–3.AA-PAR 13360.
WangenheimtoAA, 28 August1912:n.p.AA-PAR 13256.
Al-Askari,ASoldier’sStory,2 9 – 30.
46 2ThePeakofKnowledgeTransfer