fairsundertheruleofAbdülhamidII.Theprohibitionoflivefiretrainingand
maneuversinthefieldhadlefttraces,whichcouldnotbeovercomeeasilyby
improvedinstructioninthemodelregimentsandonesingleinfantryshooting
school.Thusthemilitarydeficiencies,whichhadbeennoticedbyColmarvon
derGoltzafterthemaneuversin 1909 and 1910 ,becameevident.Inthelastdec-
ades,theOttomanarmyhadfoughtmainlyagainstoutgunnedadversariesdur-
ingthesuppressionofinternaluprisingsintheOttomanprovinces.Accordingly,
theOttomanforceswerenotpreparedforwarfareagainstafullymobilizedarmy,
letaloneagainstamodernandwellequippedalliance.¹³⁰
Germany’spoliticalinterestsinthisconflictincludedthedefenseofits
sphereofinfluence,themaintenanceofthestatusquooftheOttomanstate
andthepreventionofafull-scalewarinEurope.Itisforthispurposethatthe
Germanhighcommandmadeuseofitsmilitaryinstructors.DuringtheBalkan
wars, 24 GermanofficersservedintheOttomanfieldarmy,mainlyinthearea
opposingtheBulgarianarmy.DuetoGermany’sofficialneutrality,theGerman
governmentemployedalegaltrick.TheGerman officershadtotake leave
fromtheGermanarmyandforgotheircitizenship.TheybecameOttomansub-
jectsandjoinedtheOttomanarmyforthedurationofthewarwithaguaranteed
returntoGermanserviceaftertheendofhostilities.¹³¹Theexpectationsofthe
Germanhighcommandwereclear.Officersgrantedleaveweretogainexperi-
enceandwritedetailedreportsabouttheiractivities,whicharethemainsource
forthisparagraph.Theseofficerswerekeentostudymodernwarfareinpractice,
sinceGermanmilitarytheoryhadnotbeentestedonthebattlefieldafter 1871 .¹³²
TheoutcomeofthefirstbattlesinOctober 1912 loweredGermanexpecta-
tions.AfterafailedhastyoffensiveinEasternThraceOttomantroopsrushed
backtotheÇatalcaline.Howeverthedesiretotaketheoffensivewasnotcriti-
cizedbytheGermanofficers(sinceitfitwellintoGermanprewardoctrine),but
itspoorpreparationwasreproached.¹³³
FerozeYasamee,“ArmiesDefeatedBeforeTheyTooktheField?TheOttomanMobilisation
ofOctober 1912 ,”inWarandNationalism,2 51 – 27 1.
UlrichTrumpener,“GermanMilitaryInvolvementintheFirstBalkanWar,”inEastCentral
EuropeanSocietyandtheBalkanWars,ed.BelaK.Kiralyetal.(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversity
Press, 198 7), 349.
MichaelUnger,DiebayerischenMilitärbeziehungenzurTürkeivorundimErstenWeltkrieg
(FrankfurtamMain:Lang,2003), 37.
OttovonLossow,“DieEreignissebeidertürkischenArmeeinThracien,”BayHStAGS 26 0/
2:6.OntherespectivedoctrineseeStephenVanEvera,“TheCultoftheOffensiveandtheOrigins
oftheFirstWorldWar,”InternationalSecurity 9 – 1(1984), 59.
TheBalkanWars,1912/13:TestingGroundforthe‘GermanSpirit’ 57