TheordnanceofOttomancoastaldefenseconsistedmainlyofoutdated
heavyKruppgunsinopenpositionsandwashopelesslyoutgunnedbycontem-
poraryshipartillery.²²⁹LieutenantHansRohde,whohadbeendeployedtothe
OttomandefensesonGallipoli,cametoamoreoptimisticconclusion.Helauded
theOttomandefenseagainsttheBulgarianthread duringtheBalkanWars.
Rohdeestimatedthepossibilityofanattackonthestraitsasveryhighandun-
wittinglygaveaquiteaccurateforecastoftheattackof 18 March 1915 .²³⁰Rohde
didnotenvisionabigscalelandingassaultonthepeninsulaitselfinorderto
supportthebreakthroughofthefleet.Anoperationonthatscalehadbeenre-
fusedbytheBalkanAlliancein 1912 sincetheOttomanarmyhadtobetaken
bysurprisetoguaranteethesuccessofsuchacampaign.²³¹TheGermanmilitary
missionhadusedthetimebeforethemobilizationwell.Manyoftheseverede-
ficienciesinthedefenseoftheshoreshadbeenremedied.Nevertheless,thesup-
plyofheavygunswithsufficientammunitionwastheAchillesheelofthewhole
defense.DuetotheneutralityofRomania,militaryrailwayfreightcouldnotpass
throughtheBalkanrouteandinlate 191 4thebattleforSerbiastillcontinued.
DuringtheBalkanWars,theGermanofficershadcriticizedtheinsufficient
Ottomantrenches,whichwerenotdeepenoughtoofferenoughprotectionfor
theriflemen.Theoftenhastilyexcavatedearthbankedupinfrontofthetrench
revealedone’spositiontotheenemy.Furthermore,thebarbedwiredefensesin
frontofthepositionsweresopoorlyconstructedthattheycouldbeeasily
openedbyadvancingenemytroops.²³²Thesetechnicalshortcomingswereover-
comebythebuildingoftheDardanellesdefenses.
AfterthefailureoftheAlliednavalattackon 18 March 1915 ,theenemyhad
notdaredtoattackagain,therebygivingtheOttomanengineersenoughtimeto
preparesufficientpositionsacrossthepeninsula’sshores.Uptonowithadsole-
lybeenanavaloperationreliantontheuseofminesandheavyshoreartillery
althoughtheOttomanhighcommandwasawarethatthiswastochangesoon.
411412 .BA-MARM 3036 ;Cf.thewartimereportbyPolster,“DieaustralischenHilfstruppenim
DiensteEnglands,”MWB 23 7/ 38 (1915),cols.5 587 – 5590.
Strantz,“DieVerteidigungderDardanellen,”Überall 14 – 9(1912), 636 – 63 7.
HansRohde,OperationenandenDardanellenimBalkankriege1912/ 13 (Berlin:R.Eisensch-
midt, 191 4), 92 – 97.
HolgerAfflerbach,“‘Only1PerCentofourStrength.’GermanMilitaryCommandintheGal-
lipoliCampaignandtheImpactofOttomanAllianceonGermanStrategy,”inGallipoli:ARidge
TooFar,ed.AshleyEkins(Wollombi:ExislePublishing, 20 13),181.
Cf.Hochwächter,MitdenTürkeninderFront,plate 11 ;Endres,“BerichtdeskaiserlichOt-
tomanischenMajorsFranzEndresüberseineTeilnahmeamBalkankrieg 1913 ,”BayHStAIVGS
25 7,attachmentno.4.
78 2ThePeakofKnowledgeTransfer