Caught between the developing threat of the Manchus and serious internal
rebellions, the Ming court proved incapable of settling on a coherent strat-
egy. Political infighting at court prevented any faction from pursuing a single
policy long enough for it to be effective. The rebellions were nearly destroyed
at some points, only to have the commanders impeached or recalled before
they could achieve the decisive success that would have yielded valuable
political capital. The Ming military itself was blamed in retrospect for its
inability to defeat the rebels and fend off the Manchus. Until recently,
Ming military rot was traced back to the Wanli emperor’sreign,but
Kenneth Swope has convincingly demonstrated that in military matters
Wanli was decisive and effective.^1 The Ming army performed respectably
in Wanli’s Three Great Campaigns, showing that, whatever the larger social
context, strong political leadership could invigorate the army. Lacking that
leadership, however, the army could not act successfully. Even without
strong political leadership, some parts of the Ming army were strong and
effective.
As the Manchus launched increasingly serious incursions through the
Great Wall, Chinese rebels under Li Zicheng stormed across north China,
eventually capturing the capital, Beijing, in April of 1644. The Ming
emperor, abandoned by his officials, hanged himself at the bottom of Coal
Hill. Beijing fell into rebel hands easily, leaving the Ming army posted along
the Great Wall caught between defending the border against the Manchus
and returning to the capital to restore order and the dynastic fortunes.
When the rebels advanced on his position from Beijing, Wu Sangui, the
Ming commander, chose to join the Manchus rather than submit to the
rebels. Manchu forces tipped the balance in a hard-fought battle between
Wu and the rebel’s armies. The rebels were routed, falling back through
Beijing, pursued by the Manchus. To the surprise of its residents, Beijing was
liberated from the rebels by the Manchus who quickly established order
under their own authority. Wu Sangui, his fellow commanders, and their
troops were sent in pursuit of the remaining rebel armies.
The particular and unexpected events of 1644 dramatically accelerated
the Manchus’planned conquest of the Ming. Rather than having to batter
their way through the Great Wall and the armies guarding it, the Manchu
army added the Ming border army to its own force. This provided an
important infantry component to the Manchu army, something that would
be necessary to conquer southern China and to hold territory. The Manchu
people themselves had been organized along military lines into eight“ban-
ners”that formed the basis of social, political, and army life. The cavalry
units that formed the core of the Manchu army were drawn from the banners
186 The Qing Dynasty