NATO AND ITS FRIENDS 87The USSR denied that there was any need for concern. (Not until 1988
would any of its officials admit that there was even a grain of sense in
the West’s complaints.)^7 West Germans were all too aware that if
war broke out, the first campaign would be fought on their territory.
However much they resented occupation by the Americans, British
and French, they appreciated the security they provided as they them-
selves built up their conventional troops and weapons. Membership
of NATO permitted their businesses to flourish. The West German
‘economic miracle’, started in the 1950s, was sustained over ensuing
decades, and there was no serious rival to the country’s industrial
might in the European Community.
The Bonn government tried to lessen the tensions between
America and the USSR and saw intermediate-range weapons as a
needless aggravation that, with goodwill on either side, could be elim-
inated. When Brezhnev met Schmidt in Bonn in May 1981, the West
Germans made a drastic proposal for a reduction of intermediate-
range nuclear missiles. If the USSR would remove its SS-20s, the
Americans should take away their Pershing-2s. Taken by surprise,
Brezhnev muttered something indefinite before Gromyko intervened
to insist that the Soviet Union did not intend to halt its programme of
deployment. When Schmidt refused to be put off, Brezhnev agreed to
think about the proposal. Gromyko suggested a further conversation
at the airport but he sent Deputy Minister Kornienko in his place. This
failure to follow up Schmidt’s idea was a profound error; it only gave
succour to those in the American administration like Weinberger and
Casey who argued that no compromise was feasible with the Soviet
leadership.^8
Schmidt nevertheless continued to seek closer and better ties with
the USSR and Eastern Europe. With his approval, banks in Frankfurt
and Munich provided Poland, Hungary, Romania and – above all –
East Germany with financial credits that enabled them to give the
impression of economic viability. He endorsed plans for Soviet natural
gas to be piped to West Germany. The rise in the world market prices
for petrochemicals in 1973 persuaded ministers to look outside the
Middle East for their supplies. In the period of détente, moreover,
Western powers got ready for opportunities for collaborative schemes
that would rejuvenate the Soviet economy. The crises over Afghanistan
and Poland undermined this as the Americans expanded the existing
regime of embargos on trade with the USSR and Poland. They pro-
hibited the sale of oil and gas equipment, and from June 1982 they