NATO AND ITS FRIENDS 91British policy rested on the premise that ‘destabilization of states
in the Soviet orbit’ was a desirable objective.^14 This was never stated
openly, and indeed there were concerns about the economic damage
that could occur if Poland or one of the other debtor countries in
Eastern Europe went bankrupt. Violent national revolts against com-
munist power could also have untoward consequences, at least in the
short term. If this was a worry in London, it was felt still more keenly
in Bonn where the financial implications of trouble in the East would
be on a greater scale; and nobody could safely predict how the USSR
would react to direct challenges to communist rule in its ‘outer empire’.
America and Western Europe had watched events in Poland in 1980–
1981 with deep trepidation. There was never any confidence that
Moscow would refrain from sending its forces into Warsaw. NATO
had worked out no practical plan for such a contingency, and certainly
no country in Western Europe aimed to make it a casus belli. In truth
the Cold War was a contest of attrition and preparation, exhausting for
both sides; and though West European leaders favoured the idea of a
decommunized Eastern Europe, they trod cautiously in seeking its
fulfilment and in some basic ways acted to prop up the communist
administration they hated and feared.
Compared to Western Europe, Canada gave little trouble to the
Americans. Pierre Trudeau as Prime Minister was often critical of
Reagan’s attitudes and doubtful about his competence, but offered only
faint objections to US policy. The Canadians, like other allies, knew
they benefited from the American nuclear guarantee. As one of the G7
countries, Canada was rich in natural resources which it profitably
exported to American manufacturers. The main irritation to Washing-
ton came through its refusal to cut commercial ties with Cuba and
strengthen the American economic blockade. There was a certain
amount of hypocrisy here as Canadian companies worked with the
Cubans to exploit nickel deposits on the island and sold on much of
the metal to America, where it was used in coinage.
The Japanese gave greater grounds for concern to the American
administration. Japan’s economic progress in the 1970s had started to
involve notable successes in advanced industrial technology. It made a
global impact in the sectors that produced cars, cameras, TVs and
radios, and its machine-tool factories were challenging the best that
America could produce. Japanese companies began to manufacture
military components that were used in ships for the American
navy. This was not to the liking of a defence establishment that had a