94 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
President Nixon had set on communist China since visiting Beijing in
- The American objective was to strengthen the Chinese capacity
to act as a counterweight to Soviet power in Asia. On 21 April 1984 he
approved a National Security Decision Directive to treat the People’s
Republic as a friendly, non-aligned power. The aim was to ensure
China’s disassociation from the USSR and foster a dual effort to ‘liber-
alize its totalitarian system’ and release market forces. Arms sales were
to be continued. There would be a further easing of rules on sales of
advanced technology.^5 The administration was agreed that Deng was
reforming China in a desirable direction and should receive American
help and encouragement.
On 26 April 1984 Reagan began an official visit to China. At his
meeting with Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang, he emphasized that Ameri-
ca did not want a formal alliance and was content for China to keep its
non-aligned status in world politics.^6 Deng criticized American policy
in the developing countries as well as the lack of progress towards
nuclear arms reduction, and Reagan gave as good as he got. Both of
them, however, avoided a dispute about Taiwan: they knew that this
would have ruined the atmosphere irretrievably.^7 The general effect
was positive for the two sides, and a protocol of agreement on Ameri-
can assistance with the Chinese nuclear power programme was signed
before Reagan left for America.^8
This heightened tensions in the Kremlin at a time when they were
already under strain – nerves of Politburo members had been stretched
to the extreme by the Able Archer emergency. The Americans were
deliberately building up the economic and military strength of the
USSR’s rival power in Asia. Even in the years of détente, before the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, US Presidents had made clear to
Moscow that they were determined to keep warm ties with Beijing.
Under Reagan, the linkage grew stronger. The Politburo was acutely
aware of what was happening, and was apprehensive about the uses
that his administration might make of the Chinese factor. Soviet pro-
paganda against China’s leadership was intensive. It was only slightly
less fierce about communist Yugoslavia and communist Albania. The
USSR had founded the Communist International in March 1919. It
could no longer exercise authority over foreign communist parties as
had happened in the time of Lenin and Stalin, but its leaders remained
true to the idea that the Soviet Union was the leader of the ‘world
communist movement’. For them, it was an article of faith that Lenin’s
doctrines and the October Revolution were the foundation stones