IN THE SOVIET WAITING ROOM 103Shultz retorted that it made no sense to refuse to negotiate: the sole
result would be a free gift of propaganda to the USSR. Casey and
Rowny were usually hostile to signs of indulgence towards Moscow,
but on this occasion they held back from the fray. They knew that
Reagan’s mind was set on resuming talks in Geneva. Weinberger sat
isolated, and Reagan pronounced himself in favour of Shultz under-
taking his desired initiative.^3
The American discussion took place at a time of uncertainty in
Kremlin politics. General Secretary Andropov had been ailing even at
the moment of his appointment, and on 9 February 1984 he died
after his kidneys entirely gave out. Next day the Politburo endorsed
Gromyko’s proposal for Konstantin Chernenko to become the new
General Secretary. Ustinov declared his support – Gorbachëv had
asked him to put himself forward, but he declined.^4 He had an under-
standing with the ascendant group inside the Politburo and did not
wish to disturb it. The Soviet leaders knew that Chernenko was in
poor health and had never shown an imaginative understanding of the
USSR’s problems. For decades he had operated on the sidelines as
Brezhnev’s personal assistant. Indeed, it was his weaknesses that rec-
ommended him to most of the Politburo. The Politburo veterans had
run affairs with little hindrance in Brezhnev’s last years. They wanted
to do the same again. They also aimed to put an end to the distur-
bances that Andropov had started to create. Chernenko fitted this
requirement.
He nevertheless had a little surprise up his sleeve. As was the
tradition, he kept an empty seat to his right for the man he wanted as
his unofficial deputy. To the consternation of senior comrades, his
choice fell upon Gorbachëv. As Andropov’s protégé, he had attracted
talk about being a future General Secretary. Andropov himself had
implied that this role lay ahead for him; and Tatyana Andropova was
to confide to Gorbachëv’s wife Raisa that this was the late leader’s
dying wish.^5 Politburo veterans had conspired against him when
Andropov wrote from his sickbed handing over the supervision of the
Party Secretariat to Gorbachëv. The instruction was secretly struck
from Andropov’s letter.^6
The vote for Chernenko was intended to block Gorbachëv’s eleva-
tion. Now Chernenko designated him to head the Secretariat and run
the Politburo’s Polish Commission. Gorbachëv would also remain
supreme curator of Soviet agriculture. He was never going to be a
force of inertia; and whenever the sickly Chernenko was unable to