108 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
much else that he and Chernenko told the Central Committee, was
withheld from the press. The party elite was left in no doubt that the
economic situation was worsening. Without its exports of gas and oil,
the USSR would never be able pay for the cereal imports it needed.^35
Poland increased the grounds for concern as Jaruzelski’s suppres-
sion of Solidarity failed to deliver economic benefit. This had woeful
implications for the Soviet Politburo as much as for the Polish com-
munist leadership. On 26 April 1984 Gromyko provided a depressing
analysis. The leaders in Warsaw were obstructing an increase in trade
with the USSR; they looked to the West for economic salvation.
Gromyko, a believer in the benefits of collective farms, rebuked Jaru-
zelski for showing indulgence to rural smallholders and creating a
kulak class. Jaruzelski rejected the accusation; he also claimed that the
Catholic Church was more an ally than an enemy of communism.
Gromyko concluded that Poland’s leader had not ‘matured’ enough to
manage his political responsibilities.^36 Ustinov said that Jaruzelski had
misled the Soviet leadership and was much too complacent. Adding
that the Polish United Workers Party was too passive, he expressed
concern that ‘100 per cent of those serving in the Polish army are, if
one can put it like this, the children of Solidarity’. Neither Gromyko
nor Ustinov had a clue about how to solve the problems; but they
agreed that Jaruzelski was the man who would have to shoulder
the task.^37 When Ustinov proposed a stern conversation with him,
Gorbachëv loyally hailed this as a ‘far-sighted step’.^38
The German Democratic Republic also caused anxiety in the Polit-
buro. Articles appeared in Pravda in summer 1984 with implicit
criticisms about Honecker’s dalliance with Kohl.^39 Mutual confidence
was breaking down between Moscow and East Berlin. Honecker
received a summons to the USSR. Chernenko was too ill to attend and
Gorbachëv presided and angrily tore into Honecker.^40 Gorbachëv was
speaking for the entire Politburo, which recognized the grounds for
concern not merely about East Germany and Poland but Eastern
Europe as a whole. Ustinov told the Politburo that the behaviour of
Kádár, Zhivkov and even Husák was just as suspect as Honecker. KGB
Chairman Chebrikov sided with Ustinov. Gorbachëv too expressed his
worries.^41
The Politburo’s worries about the arms race with America were
intensifying, and on 29 June 1984 the Soviet leadership decided to
propose talks about how to prevent the militarization of outer space.
Moscow’s hope was to bring the Strategic Defense Initiative to a halt