IN THE SOVIET WAITING ROOM 109by agreement.^42 The American administration welcomed the overture
while staying determined that any negotiations should cover a wider
range of aspects of arms control. This attitude, however, was chal-
lenged at the US National Security Council on 18 September, when
Shultz and Weinberger fell into dispute.^43 Shultz wanted talks; Wein-
berger opposed the whole idea. Reagan refrained from arbitrating
between them, but agreed to a Washington visit by Foreign Affairs
Minister Gromyko. He did not want to end his term in office before
giving world peace a chance. Shultz was hungry for more knowledge
of Kremlin politics than American agencies were providing and hoped
that Gromyko might give useful clues.^44 He commended Reagan for
striking the right balance. Despite having condemned Soviet barbarity
in shooting down the Korean airliner, the President wanted to send an
arms control delegation back to Geneva for talks with the Soviets.^45
When Gromyko arrived on 26 September 1984, a grand reception
awaited him. At a cocktail party before lunch, the minister approached
Nancy Reagan with unaccustomed charm. He was drinking cranberry
juice, she soda water. He asked: ‘Is your husband for peace or for war?’
When peace was her answer, he enquired: ‘Are you sure?’ After she
said yes, he asked: ‘Why, then, does he not agree to our proposals?’ As
the guests took their seats at the table, Gromyko came across and said:
‘So don’t forget to whisper the word “peace” in the President’s ear
every night.’ Mrs Reagan replied: ‘Of course I will, and I’ll also whisper
it in yours too.’^46 The barriers to talks began to be dismantled over the
following weeks. Reagan dedicated his energies to his campaign for
re-election against Democratic Party candidate and former Vice Presi-
dent Walter Mondale. He achieved a stunning victory on 6 November
by winning in forty-nine out of fifty states. Both he and the Soviet
leadership saw the opportunity to resume negotiations about both
nuclear weapons and outer space. On 17 November the Kremlin deliv-
ered its official acceptance, and Shultz and Gromyko were scheduled
to meet in Geneva on 7 January 1985. The diplomatic frost had started
- only started – to melt after years of glaciation.^47
One of the obvious obstacles to progress was the state of Chernen-
ko’s health. The American side would find it difficult to come to an
agreement with the USSR while an ailing leader remained in power.
The fact that Chernenko appeared so seldom in public led to spec u-
lation in Western capitals about who was likely to succeed him.
Gorbachëv’s name was mentioned with rising expectancy, but nobody
was predicting a political transformation if he were to become General