THE MOSCOW REFORM TEAM 135little interest in new weapons or equipment. He wanted the country’s
genuine specialists – and not just the army commanders – to have an
input.^54 Not once did Gorbachëv ask for a reworking of the drafts he
received. He never imposed his personal preferences on either the Big
Five or the working group. He only rarely addressed a personal query
to the Party Defence Department – and that was only to get some
detail or other clarified.^55 He accepted all proposals, big or small, that
came up to him from the system he had sanctioned.^56
His passivity was one of his conjuring tricks. The reality, as scep-
tics about reform ruefully appreciated, was that Zaikov and the Big
Five were following Gorbachëv’s instructions on the big questions of
the day.^57 By remaining outside its membership, Gorbachëv could pre-
tend to be impartial. He could also spare himself some time and
energy. When the General Staff made a fuss, Zaikov spelled out the
ground rules to Akhromeev: ‘You know, Sergei Fëdorovich, the time
has passed when you and Georgi Markovich [Kornienko] alone for-
mulated the country’s policy on disarmament questions. Now it’s the
state leadership that formulates it. You’d do well to take this into
account.’^58 Kataev of the Party Defence Department admired how
Zaikov insisted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should have as
much influence as the Defence Ministry on questions of external
security.^59 If Zaikov failed to secure what the reformers wanted,
Shevardnadze would step in and say: ‘Very well, let’s put this aside and
I’ll talk it over with Mikhail Sergeevich.’ People soon began to under-
stand that Shevardnadze assumed that when he felt baulked, he could
put his opinion to the General Secretary and compel the Big Five to
comply with it.^60
But Gorbachëv and his fellow reformers knew that they were only
at the start of their campaign. Although they had the cooperation of
Chebrikov and the KGB, they could expect difficulty with the high
command despite all of Zaikov’s successes in the Big Five. Akhromeev
and Sokolov frequently behaved as if they would only support reform
in the armed forces if they were the ones to initiate it. The wind of
change gusting through party, government and Foreign Ministry was
only a gentle breeze in the Soviet armed forces.^61
For the transformation of Soviet foreign and security policy,
Gorbachëv placed his trust in Shevardnadze. This allowed him to
concentrate on internal political and economic reforms while Yakov-
lev oversaw the renovation of the media. The three of them set about
their tasks with a furious intensity – and Shevardnadze began to suffer