13. ONE FOOT ON THE ACCELERATOR
Reagan’s instincts told him that something extraordinary was happen-
ing in the Kremlin. Bush and Shultz felt the same after meeting the
new General Secretary at Chernenko’s funeral; and Shultz was eager to
test out Gorbachëv’s intentions in direct talks.^1 The news from Moscow
was full of surprises, not least about the Afghan war. India’s Prime
Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, heard in person from the Soviet leaders in
June 1985 that they were working on how to enable a military with-
drawal. Gandhi passed this information on to the Americans. Big
changes were in prospect.^2
The American administration still needed the evidence that they
were more than an ephemeral ploy. On 30 April 1985 the President
wrote to Gorbachëv expressing disquiet about the recent shooting of
Major Nicholson, a US military intelligence officer who had been on
a perfectly legal mission north of Berlin. He lamented the Soviet
military intervention in Afghanistan. He stressed that the Americans
would base their judgement on what happened in practice rather than
on promises. He expressed pleasure about the resumption of the
Geneva talks but challenged the Soviet standpoint on his Strategic
Defense Initiative. Gorbachëv had remarked to Speaker Tip O’Neill on
his Moscow visit earlier in the month that the American programme
was offensive in purpose. Reagan pointed out that Soviet scientists
were carrying out research with the aim of matching the Defense
Initiative. He offered his own assurance that American scientists
needed years of further research; and he promised to consult with
other governments before ordering any deployment. He drew atten-
tion to Moscow’s infringements of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He
proclaimed the desirability of deep cuts in nuclear weapon stockpiles
and looked forward to fostering a better atmosphere between the two
sides.^3
The ping-pong continued as Gorbachëv replied that responsible
people in the American establishment knew full well that the Strategic