ONE FOOT ON THE ACCELERATOR 139Defense Initiative had a disguised aggressive intent. (He failed to see
that this was hardly a complimentary remark to make to the Presi-
dent.) He added that if the Americans could improve the chances of
peace in Afghanistan if they ceased supplying the mujahidin.^4 He
assured Reagan that the USSR would do whatever was necessary to
preserve ‘strategic parity’.^5
Shultz guessed that Gorbachëv had not written the harsher bits of
his correspondence; and Jack Matlock, who in 1983 had been brought
into the National Security Council as its Russian-speaking expert and
director of European and Soviet affairs, agreed with him.^6 But it was
hard to persuade Casey that anything had changed in the Kremlin.
The CIA forecast that the only difference that Gorbachëv would make
in the arms control talks was in introducing a degree of political flair.^7
The USSR was constantly increasing its offensive capacity with more
sophisticated weapon systems, and the Politburo was unlikely to allow
its economic difficulties to affect this orientation. Although Soviet
leaders might not want armed conflict with America, there existed
potential scenarios when it would decide to order its forces into
action. A Third World War remained a distinct possibility.^8 Casey and
his officials repeatedly contended that the new General Secretary was
a traditionalist who would continue to confront America, bully East-
ern Europe and stay put in Afghanistan.^9 The CIA predicted that there
would be only marginal adjustments in Soviet foreign policy. The
USSR’s economy might experience a temporary stimulus from Gor-
bachëv’s efforts to change practices at the workplace; and he would
probably pursue agreements in the arms control talks as a way of alle-
viating the strain on Soviet finances. But the general situation would
remain the same.^10
Defense Secretary Weinberger and Assistant Secretary Perle
agreed with Casey; they could see no reason to change America’s
stance. Rowny did at least allow for the chance that Gorbachëv might
astound them all, but he too thought it unlikely. The early signs as he
saw them were that the new Soviet leader would opt for continuity.^11
This was also the line taken by influential conservative periodicals.
William F. Buckley Jr, National Review editor and friend of Reagan,
suggested that the very fact that Gorbachëv was ‘humorous, well-
traveled, well educated, articulate [and] intelligent’ served only to
make him ‘a more dangerous man than he otherwise would be’.^12
When Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige mooted the idea of
reviving trade talks with Moscow, Perle reacted with disapproval.