ONE FOOT ON THE ACCELERATOR 143nadze replied that the USSR truly sought a political resolution to the
Afghan war. He denied that the radar station was illegal. He empha-
sized that America and the Soviet Union were militarily ‘in a state of
rough parity’, which could now provide the basis for mutual concilia-
tion.^31
Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze knew that they would face internal
difficulties before they could achieve any such aim. Getting Gromyko
out of the Foreign Affairs Ministry was a definite help, but First
Deputy Minister Kornienko behaved as if Gromyko was still the
minister. When he did not like what the leadership suggested, he said
that his ‘party conscience did not permit’ him to express approval.^32
His boldness drew strength from his work and friendship with
Akhromeev in the General Staff. Speaking to the Dutch Ambassador,
Kornienko claimed that nothing at all had changed in Soviet foreign
policy. He said this despite Gorbachëv’s orders for the ministry to give
serious attention to Holland’s follow-up to the Belgian overture on
intermediate-range nuclear missiles.^33 The chance was lost to win over
the Western Europeans by the kind of grand gesture that might have
prevented the installation of cruise missiles in the Low Countries.^34
Shevardnadze decided to avoid a clash with Kornienko, whose expert-
ise he continued to praise. He commented: ‘In questions of security,
the military have the last word.’ Kornienko thought this gave him carte
blanche to act as he wished.^35 Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze assumed
that until they achieved something serious with America and its allies,
it made little sense to ditch people like Kornienko.^36
Gorbachëv did the rounds of the leadership and put the case for
aiming at an arms reduction agreement. The General Staff was less
than pleased, and Akhromeev got heated whenever Gorbachëv
broached the topic. Akhromeev and Kornienko regularly conferred
about how to hold the traditional line.^37
Even Akhromeev, though, appreciated that the unremitting accu-
mulation of nuclear weaponry was irrational.^38 But he wanted
everything done on his terms. Gorbachëv had a degree of trouble at a
consultation that he held for the delegation that was leaving for the
Geneva arms talks. Primed by Kornienko, Akhromeev raged against
the very idea of exploring the possibility of decreasing the nuclear
missiles in Europe. Gorbachëv saw the need for support from the
Politburo, and when he asked it directly to sanction an arms reduction
policy, only Gromyko registered an objection.^39 On 18 September 1985
Gorbachëv called another meeting of military and diplomatic officials.