144 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
It lasted an hour and a half. Akhromeev and Lieutenant General
Nikolai Chervov defended the policy of keeping all the SS-20s intact
and in readiness. Kovalëv and Adamishin stood up to them. Such
was Adamishin’s enthusiasm for reform that Kornienko, his superior
in the ministry, wanted to record a reprimand on his personal file.
Gorbachëv handled the debate rather cautiously and Adamishin for
a while wondered whether he himself had stepped too far out of line.
But Gorbachëv won the debate. Adamishin was enraptured: ‘The main
thing is that he’s as cunning as the Devil – or even better, as a peasant.
A born politician, leader.’^40
In August 1985 Gorbachëv took another initiative when he
announced that the USSR would adjourn underground nuclear ex -
plosion tests through to the end of the year. He made no requirement
for Reagan to copy him. The USSR was conducting a moratorium as a
surety of its peaceful purposes. Gorbachëv signalled that if America
were to do the same, he would aim to suspend the testing programme
over a longer period.^41
A bustle of exchanges between Moscow and Washington led to a
decision for a summit meeting between General Secretary and Presi-
dent towards the end of the year. They chose Geneva as their venue.
Reagan had never met any of Gorbachëv’s predecessors or attended
their funerals. Gorbachëv had already made a difference in global pol-
itics, and Reagan could not afford to ignore him. People all over the
world were waiting for them to talk to each other. In this situation,
he called together the National Security Council to arrange for
the encounter in the light of the Soviet leader’s growing impact. The
debate was consensual in tone. Everyone agreed on the need to maxi-
mize support from ‘three key audiences’: America’s allies, the American
Congress and American public opinion. CIA Director Casey alerted
him to the kind of traps that might lie ahead. He warned that Gor-
bachëv could try and push him into confining the Strategic Defense
Initiative to research in laboratories and banning testing and deploy-
ment.^42 (Casey was making a guess that was soon proved to be
prescient.)
Shultz asked for a brighter approach. He told National Security
Adviser McFarlane that the President performed at his best when he
felt ‘confident and comfortable’ – and too many people near to him
were making him worried. He advised Reagan to stop listening to his
advisers. Naturally this annoyed McFarlane; it was scarcely more
appealing for Don Regan, the self-confident former CEO of Merrill