146 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
impression after contact with politicians and journalists.^48 Casey and
Weinberger by contrast liked what they had heard at the press confer-
ence. On 20 September 1985 at the National Security Council they
put the case for no compromise with the USSR. McFarlane supported
them by adding that many observers regarded Gorbachëv’s pro-
nouncements as ‘old propaganda in new packaging’; he suggested the
need for the President to shift the focus of attention from arms control
topics to Afghanistan and human rights observance in the USSR.
Shultz could do little more than say that the American side would
get nowhere by insisting the Soviet leadership was merely engaged
in a propaganda campaign.^49 He had to hope that the pendulum of
the presidential mind would swing back in his direction before the
summit.
Moscow newspapers endorsed the idea of ‘nuclear winter’.
Nay-sayers among Western scientists who challenged Carl Sagan’s
hypothesis were branded as ‘obscurantists’. Moscow depicted itself as a
fortress of science and humanity.^50 The Soviet leadership continued
what it called its peace offensive in pursuit of convincing the world
that all the warmongers were based in Washington.
Shevardnadze was cautious in preparing for his speech to the
United Nations General Assembly in September 1985. He was in
America for the first time. As yet he felt unable to strike a tone that
differed from Gromyko’s.^51 Events also pulled him up short. KGB
officer Oleg Gordievski, under suspicion as a double agent, had dis-
appeared in Moscow while out jogging in mid-July. His British
controllers made arrangements to spirit him over the Finnish border
and bring him to safety in the United Kingdom. Shevardnadze com-
plained to British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe in New York about
the use of methods appropriate to a Conan Doyle story.^52 But he kept
a smile on his face. His team were pleased with his willingness to think
outside the traditional parameters.^53 Everyone commented on his
charming demeanour. Having been unable to attend Shultz’s speech,
he offered gracious apologies.^54 The American press praised him as
belonging to a new type of Soviet leader. When Shevardnadze met
Reagan on 27 September 1985, he had a surprise in store. He brought
with him a personal letter from Gorbachëv containing a proposal to
halve strategic nuclear arsenals with immediate effect.^55
Although Reagan stifled any obvious reaction, McFarlane was
visibly disconcerted. The Americans had been talking about an initial
reduction by thirty or thirty-five per cent. Now Gorbachëv was out-