148 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Paris and Washington still further. President Mitterrand had been
open about his unhappiness with the Strategic Defense Initiative. At
Chernenko’s funeral, he had issued an invitation to Gorbachëv to visit
France, which Gorbachëv accepted a few days later.^60 The Americans,
slightly disconcerted, passed on what they had learned from Shevard-
nadze about Gorbachëv’s policy on arms reduction. They could not
afford to let the new Soviet leader catch the French unawares. Mitter-
rand assured Robert McFarlane that he would not permit France’s
dissent about the Strategic Defense Initiative to become a ‘weapon’ in
Gorbachëv’s hands.^61
The Paris visit lasted four days from 2 October 1985. The new
General Secretary was at last on display to the outside world and the
media interest was intense. As usual with a Soviet politician, crowds
gathered to protest against the abuses of human rights in the USSR. A
demonstration was organized at the Place du Trocadéro.^62 Gorbachëv
dealt with all this calmly, and the French public liked his bonhomie
and declarations of peaceful intent. He struck everyone as very
‘Western’ in appearance and demeanour. He dressed smartly. His suit
and even his choice of hat attracted admiring comments. He scored
high marks simply for refusing to look glum and calculating. With his
ready smile and conversational style, he appeared a match in repartee
for every Western politician he encountered. However formal or alien
the nature of the occasion, he showed that he could adapt to its
requirements. Nothing overawed him, not even the pomp of a week-
end at Chequers with Mrs Thatcher the previous year, before he
became General Secretary. His instinct had told him to avoid appear-
ing too impressed. Likewise in Paris, he behaved as though he had
taken in French politesse with his mother’s milk.
He seized attention with his proposal for a fifty per cent reduction
in all nuclear armaments. He called for a total ban on ‘space-strike’
weaponry. He was willing to keep the talks on intermediate-range mis-
siles separate from all this. He also looked forward to negotiating
independently with the British and French. He reported that the USSR
had 243 SS-20s in its European zone – the number had not increased
since the previous year. He promised to make no addition to these
forces and called on America to do the same. National Security Council
officials in Washington took note, and intelligence reports acknow-
ledged that Gorbachëv’s claims about his SS-20s could well be correct.^63
Gorbachëv was making his mark and the American administration
needed to be ready to respond to any fresh overtures. Mitterrand