14. TO GENEVA
After Paris, Gorbachëv focused on preparing the ground among
Moscow’s traditional allies and friends for the tactics he would use at
the Geneva summit. Although none was likely to cause trouble, he
hoped to enjoy their active cooperation. He was aware that his reforms
were disturbing people in the ‘fraternal’ communist leadership. He had
to convince them that what he wanted to say to Reagan conformed to
their interests.
The Afghan communists would predictably be the ones who most
disliked his ideas, so he invited Babrak Karmal back to Moscow for
talks on 10 October 1985. It was a difficult conversation. Gorbachëv
found fault with the Afghan army’s inactivity while the Soviet Army
was continuing to lose so many soldiers. He called on Karmal to re -
introduce private trade, restore respect for Islam and share power with
oppositionist elements.^1 Gorbachëv reported to the Politburo that he
had given Karmal until summer 1986 to get ready to rely on his own
forces. Although the USSR would continue its supplies of equipment,
the Soviet armed forces would be planning their departure. At the
Politburo, Gorbachëv read out letters from Soviet citizens who asked
why Russians were still fighting in Afghanistan. While stopping
short of calling the original invasion a blunder, he called for a speedy
withdrawal regardless of the difficulty in predicting how Karmal
would deal with the military consequences. Sokolov, Politburo member
as well as Defence Minister, raised no objection. Nor did Gromyko,
whom everyone knew was one of the perpetrators of the Afghan
imbroglio, and his failure to oppose Gorbachëv was noteworthy. The
new Politburo line was to remain confidential, but it was plain that big
changes were under way in the Kremlin.^2
Gorbachëv’s next task was to brief the Warsaw Pact leaders about
how he planned to handle the Americans at the Geneva summit.
Flying to Sofia on 22 October 1985, he reported to the Political Con-
sultative Committee. He wanted to work for an agreement to eliminate