152 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
cancelled purchases of Bulgarian wine despite the predictable damage to
Bulgaria’s finances. When Gorbachëv asked Eastern Europe to integrate
its economies with the Soviet one, he was whistling in the wind.
Fellow leaders listened more attentively when he turned to ques-
tions of foreign policy. East Germany’s Honecker put in a good word
for Chinese leaders who at last had dropped their doctrine of the inev-
itability of world war. Honecker evidently wanted to assert himself
as the sagacious communist veteran. Gorbachëv graciously accepted
the advice and indicated his desire for a rapprochement with Beijing.^11
Hungary’s Kádár cautioned against any impatience since it would be
some time before China could realign itself with other communist
countries.^12 Ceauşescu, dispelling his usual scepticism, saluted Gor-
bachëv’s focus on achieving a political settlement in Afghanistan and
pulling out the Soviet Army.^13 Jaruzelski drew attention to his own
problems. He grumbled that Reagan had recently welcomed a Solidar-
ity leader at the White House – his only consolation came from a
recent opinion poll that purported to suggest a growth in Polish pop-
ular antipathy towards America.^14 Gorbachëv thanked the leaders for
their lively, comradely spirit. He hailed the display of unity and was
optimistic about the communist order in Eastern Europe, declaring: ‘It
is important to get together and synchronize watches, and the watches
are [in fact] running normally. Perhaps the second hands deviate
somewhat, but not the hour or the minute hands.’^15
Shevardnadze flew on to America and met Reagan at the Waldorf
Astoria in New York on 24 October 1985. He deplored recent declara-
tions by American officials, which he said were hardly conducive to
success at the arms talks or at the summit. He asked for Shultz to fly
over to Moscow so as to clear the political air. Reagan agreed to the
request while emphasizing that there could be no treaty without a
change in the Kremlin’s attitude to human rights. Quite apart from
his own opinions, he pointed out that the American Congress would
not budge unless some improvement took place.^16 On the same day,
accompanied by Shultz, he held a meeting with other G7 leaders.
Everyone expressed the hope for a successful summit in Geneva.
Thatcher called him ‘our champion’. Kohl urged him to talk to Gor-
bachëv without a bevy of officials in attendance.^17
Reagan wrote to Gorbachëv confirming agreement to the idea of
reducing strategic nuclear weapons by fifty per cent; he added that
ways should be found to eliminate intermediate-range weaponry –
and he said that Shultz would visit Moscow to prepare the ground for