156 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
university in the old part of the city at the southern tip of Lake
Geneva. The President had reconnoitred the venue two days earlier.
The chateau was close to the lakeside, and he aimed to ask Gorbachëv
to walk down to it and have a one-on-one conversation at the pool-
house. He had read a pile of briefing papers and recorded in his diary:
‘Lord, I hope I’m ready and not over-trained.’^36 He charmed everyone
from the very start. Nobody in the Soviet leadership, apart from
Ambassador Dobrynin, had expected the President to be quite so like-
able. When Adamishin shook hands with him, he instantly decided he
was ‘a sympathetic old man’.^37 (This was not a retrospective judgement
but what he recorded in his diary.) Reagan’s affability overlaid his cun-
ning. He stood on the steps of the building without benefit of overcoat
on a cold winter’s day. The intention was to emphasize that his age had
no influence on his health and energy – and later when Gorbachëv
hosted a Soviet reception for Reagan, he too dispensed with outdoor
wear: he was a quick learner.^38 The tussle was not just about youthful-
ness and dress. Reagan and Gorbachëv were rivals for the image of the
world’s peacemaker.
Their first session was meant to last a quarter of an hour. In fact it
continued for an hour.^39 Gorbachëv tried to persuade the President
that, whatever he read in American publications, the Soviet economy
was not facing collapse. The arms race was therefore not a way to force
the USSR to its knees.^40 Reagan, when his turn came, stressed the
desire for an arms reduction agreement. Limitation was not enough:
there had to be a drastic decrease in the nuclear weapons on both
sides. He insisted that his Strategic Defense Initiative had no offensive
potential.^41 In the afternoon, Gorbachëv sprang a surprise by revealing
his wish for a political settlement to the Afghan war. He asked for
American cooperation in the process. He indicated a preference for
Afghanistan to adopt a non-aligned status in world politics if he
were to withdraw the Soviet Army.^42 Reagan was less pleased when
Gorbachëv dismissed any idea that the Defense Initiative could ever
prevent every single missile from getting through to its target. Gor-
bachëv was ratcheting up the pressure. He accused the President of
starting a new stage in the arms race with the Initiative.^43 Reagan gave
his word that his programme excluded the objective of launching a
first strike on the USSR. He suggested that the focus of their conversa-
tions should be turned on how to reduce their nuclear weapons by fifty
per cent.^44
They adjourned before meeting up again at the pool-house un -