TO GENEVA 159job is to show him he and they will be better off if we make some prac-
tical agreements, without attempting to convert him to our way of
thinking.’^64
Reagan sensed that the ice was cracking in global politics and
wanted to strengthen his collaboration with Secretary Shultz. Together
they were beginning to achieve an understanding with the USSR.
Shultz was proving himself a brilliant enabler – the only worry for
Reagan was that he might find the job too exhausting and quit.^65 With-
out the Secretary’s persistence, the President knew he would find it
hard to achieve his purposes. The summit had gone well. He saw
reason to hope that it would be the first in a series of productive
encounters.
Gorbachëv felt the same. From Geneva, Gorbachëv flew to Prague
to report to the Warsaw Pact’s Political Consultative Committee.^66 The
absence of a definite agreement with Reagan failed to dampen his
optimism. He had not gone to the summit expecting to sign a treaty.
Although Reagan had refused to budge on the Strategic Defense
Initiative, this had hardly come as a surprise. More work needed to
be done. Foreign Affairs Ministry official Anatoli Adamishin prepared
a statement for him announcing that a new stage in international
politics had begun and that the lowest point in US–USSR relations
was a thing of the past. This was too much for Georgi Kornienko,
who scratched out what he saw as Adamishin’s excess of enthusiasm.^67
The Political Consultative Committee was anyhow a triumph for
Gorbachëv. Fellow leaders cheered his performance. Honecker spoke
warmly about how Gorbachëv had awakened the conscience of the
people he had spoken to; Husák commended his success in reaching
out to broader circles of opinion than any Soviet leader had managed.
Kádár welcomed what he called Gorbachëv’s effective challenge to the
anticommunist course of American foreign policy. Jaruzelski declared
that the achievement at Geneva must never be lost. Even Ceauşescu
squeezed out some approving comments.^68
On 25 November 1985 Shevardnadze told his ministry that
Reagan now knew that the USSR would never surrender. ‘Positive dia-
logue’ was on the horizon. But Shevardnadze also said that Kádár had
been wrong to say that America’s ‘anticommunist course’ had been
broken.^69 An open discussion ensued in the ministry collegium. Look-
ing for ways to crack Reagan’s resolve, Kovalëv contended that the
USSR could put Washington under political stress by seeking support
from France, West Germany, Italy and Holland as well as from the