162 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Aristov that the Americans genuinely hoped to strengthen mutual
economic links. Though the ban remained on exporting goods of
‘strategic’ importance, there was opportunity for the Soviet Union to
bid for sales of medical, agricultural and mining equipment.^6 Moscow
welcomed the idea. It was less happy about other measures that the
Americans undertook after the summit. Secretary Shultz flew off on a
tour of Europe’s capitals and on 14 December, after reaching West
Berlin, he stated bluntly that America did ‘not accept incorporation of
Eastern Europe, including East Germany and East Berlin, into a Soviet
sphere of influence’.^7 He accentuated America’s policy of favouring
those East European leaders who kept their distance from the
Kremlin. Next day in Bucharest he impressed on Ceauşescu that his
repressive policies made it difficult to persuade the American Senate
to assist economic cooperation.^8 He was gentler in Budapest, where,
indeed, he praised General Secretary Kádár: ‘I did a lot of listening,
and I felt he had a great deal of wisdom.’^9
Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze said nothing about Shultz’s tour
since they wanted to hold their focus on completing perestroika in the
USSR and on achieving a relaxation with America.^10 If Eastern Europe
started its own reform, that would be all to the good. But the time for
orders from Moscow was at an end. Change had to happen through
consent.^11 In March 1986, when appointing Vadim Medvedev as Cen-
tral Committee secretary with responsibility for the ‘socialist countries’,
Gorbachëv would remind him to avoid the temptation to meddle in
their politics. Medvedev regularly contacted the East European party
leaders and consulted Soviet ambassadors. His task was to free
Shevardnadze to work on the rest of Soviet foreign policy.^12 Gorbachëv
kept up the momentum achieved in Geneva. The concern for him and
Shevardnadze was that Reagan might renounce the spirit of Geneva
and become confrontational. They also worried about the resistance in
the USSR to any programme of arms reduction. Shevardnadze con-
tacted the leading diplomats at the talks with America in Geneva,
Stockholm and Vienna – they were all in Moscow for the winter
vacation. He instructed them to draft proposals to revive the prospect
of bilateral agreements.^13
The talks in the three European cities belonged to an interlocking
process that was meant to make the world safer through mutual under-
standings. Those that took place in Geneva captured the greatest public
attention because they centred on nuclear disarmament. The on-going
negotiation in Stockholm dealt with ‘security and co-oper ation in