164 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
opinion; he predicted success with the West Germans and other Euro-
peans. The American administration would find it difficult to stonewall
him: ‘This year is the year of peace.’^19
Gorbachëv caused consternation in the General Staff.^20 Marshal
Akhromeev did not mind pacific language as such: what he found
shocking was Gorbachëv’s apparent sincerity when using it. He had
an accomplice in Kornienko at the Foreign Affairs Ministry. As the
Deputy Minister, Kornienko cheekily slowed down the processing of
documents which Shevardnadze had commissioned with an arms
reduction agreement in mind.^21 Shevardnadze and Gorbachëv under-
estimated Kornienko’s capacity for mischief. When they parted at
Geneva airport, they took turns to embrace him and said ‘thanks for
everything’.^22 Akhromeev and Kornienko had no intention of letting
Gorbachëv do as he pleased. As soon as they heard about his
post-summit consultations, they plotted how to counteract the latest
schemes that the Politburo had approved. Kornienko informed Akhro-
meev about the way things were going. Both could see that nothing
could be achieved by means of a direct challenge to Gorbachëv and
Shevardnadze. They opted instead for an approach that involved
Akhromeev in offering his own programme for arms reduction on
behalf of the General Staff. His real aim was to emasculate Gorbachëv’s
proposals through cunning and kindness.^23
On 7 January 1986 Varennikov, Akhromeev’s deputy, invited offi-
cials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Party Defence
Department to a confidential meeting in his office.^24 He gave no
advance signal. No one in the Politburo except Shevardnadze heard
about it until after the event – and Shevardnadze himself received no
invitation. The KGB and even the Defence Ministry was kept in the
dark. Varennikov wanted to achieve a big impact, and surprise was his
tool of choice.^25
Varennikov read out a plan for disarmament that Akhromeev had
drawn up. It would involve the elimination of absolutely every class
of nuclear weapons. After explaining Akhromeev’s computation of
the destructive capacities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Varennikov
described a programme for multilateral arms reduction in three stages
through to the year 2000.^26 Akhromeev and Varennikov were being
disingenuous, as Colonel General Andrian Danilevich of the General
Staff later explained: