166 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Akhromeev claimed to have been working on his project for a year
and a half. He said that the Politburo’s recent discussions had served to
bring forward the moment of presentation. Nobody challenged his
story – and Akhromeev radiated confidence about gaining the General
Secretary’s seal of approval.^31
Akhromeev ignored the convention for the Big Five to discuss
drafts on arms reduction policy before they reached the General
Secretary or the Politburo. Gorbachëv did not appear to mind. As
Akhromeev had predicted, the General Secretary gave his instant
approval to the General Staff ’s entire proposal. Gorbachëv never
explained his motives in changing his negotiating tactics. In Geneva
he had offered to bargain separately about each category of nuclear
weapons. Now he put forward an all-inclusive package. Perhaps he
reckoned his ideas as the best disarmament project that was acceptable
to the high command. Or possibly it was the sheer scope of the three-
stage programme that caught his fancy. The global liquidation of
nuclear weaponry was just the kind of slogan that would gain the
world’s attention.
Shevardnadze recognized that the project might annoy the Ameri-
cans; but once Gorbachëv had approved it, Shevardnadze could only
give battle over the details. On 10 January 1986 he criticized Akhro-
meev’s ideas at the Big Five. It was the first time that he spoke at
variance with the General Secretary’s known preferences. Either that
or Gorbachëv had given his blessing for him to carry out what he
chose not to do for himself. Two other Politburo members, Chebrikov
and Zaikov, were at the meeting. The three of them came together in
ridiculing Akhromeev’s argument that his project would induce the
Americans to agree to an arms reduction treaty. A brisk debate ensued,
and Akhromeev could not pull rank as the troika from the Politburo
insisted on drastic revision. Their main amendment demanded the
complete removal of intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Europe
in the very first scheduled stage of the programme. Shevardnadze was
hoping to assure the White House that the USSR was not trying to
postpone the most sensitive matters to the end of the century. After
intensive discussion, Akhromeev saw that he had to give way. If ever
he had imagined that the General Staff would completely dominate
policy, he was beginning to learn his lesson.^32
Nevertheless he had preserved his other main objectives, and his
political opponents could get no further in amending the programme.
There was lasting resentment in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that