168 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
reduce their stockpiles and liquidate all their tactical nuclear arms
(which were defined as having a range of up to 1,000 kilometres). The
veto on offensive space weapons would become multilateral. The third
and final stage would begin in 1995, when every remaining nuclear
bomb of any kind whatsoever would be eliminated. The declaration
also envisaged rapid progress in removing chemical weapons and a
ban on the development of any form of non-nuclear weapons on new
physical principles.^37
On 16 January, when introducing his programme in Pravda,
Gorbachëv announced an extension of his unilateral moratorium on
nuclear arms testing and invited the American to follow his example.
He announced the USSR’s full commitment to the disarmament talks
in Geneva and Stockholm. His proposals, he claimed, were preferable
to an arms race in space weaponry. Instead of Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’
project, he urged, efforts should be made to use the world’s resources
for peaceful purposes.^38
He put his faith in winning over global public opinion and making
it difficult for the American administration to reject his programme.
Better than any Soviet leader since Lenin, he knew how to aim his
appeal over the heads of political leaders. Shevardnadze rhapsodized
about the prospect of a foreign policy based on the idea that America
and the USSR were ‘competitors’ rather than enemies.^39 The Soviet
internal reforms were changing the country’s image abroad and help-
ing to narrow the White House’s choices in policy.^40 The Americans
could no longer point to the USSR as the main obstacle to disarma-
ment. The Kremlin was making a big offer, and the onus was now on
Washington to decide how to respond.^41 Gorbachëv and Shevardnadze
saw Weinberger, who did not hide his scepticism about arms reduc-
tion, as an easy target.^42 Radical officials in the ministry like Anatoli
Adamishin were of like mind. While admitting that the January decla-
ration contained elements of ‘utopia’, Adamishin was pleased that
these were balanced by ‘concretenesses’.^43
Gorbachëv’s diplomatic Blitzkrieg had started. Enthusiasm re-
placed calm judgement inside the Politburo. Soviet leaders were
confident that they were thrusting the Americans on to the defensive.