AMERICAN REJECTION 171Defense Secretary Perle had never found it easy to stay silent. He told
the American Senior Arms Control Group that Reagan’s commitment
to total nuclear disarmament was a disaster. Rowny too advocated a
brisk scepticism. As an inveterate critic of Soviet policy and practice,
he denied that there was anything good to say about perestroika. He
suggested that if the Americans stayed calm and held their ground,
the Soviet declaration would be seen for what it was and would ‘fall of
its own weight’.^16
Nitze, who was usually on Shultz’s side, put up a negative analysis.
He slated Gorbachëv for having ‘front-loaded’ his declaration in such
a way as to provide only the USSR with its requirements in the first
stage. The West would have to wait for the later stages to obtain its
objectives – and this would mean that America would need to rely
on Soviet good faith over several years. What is more, Gorbachëv
was demanding that France and Britain should eliminate their entire
nuclear arsenal. He had also left Asia out of his declaration. Nitze
worried that the Kremlin would keep nuclear missiles on its Asian
territories and retain the instant capacity to transport them across
the Urals and launch them from European Russia against Western
Europe.^17
By 3 February 1986, at the National Security Planning Group, the
mood had moved perceptibly closer to Shultz. Even Weinberger was
against portraying the January declaration as ‘a publicity stunt’; he
reasoned that any stark rejection of Gorbachëv’s overture would serve
to boost his image as a peacemaker. He was more like his usual self
when he spoke against compromise on the Strategic Defense Initiative.
He also opposed the idea of fixing a schedule for the total abolition of
nuclear weapons.^18 Shultz favoured a more affirmative approach. The
Americans in his opinion should concentrate on offering their own
variant of a first stage of disarmament. By planning for a drastic reduc-
tion in nuclear weapons stockpiles, they would prevent Gorbachëv
from monopolizing the image as a man of peace.^19 Casey intervened to
insist that there could be no reduction without procedures of ‘effective
verification’.^20 Weinberger agreed about the insincerity of the Soviet
leaders, arguing that this would help to ‘smoke them out’. He bristled
when Shultz teased him for moving over to the Department of State’s
position. Weinberger barked that although the administration’s inter-
nal disagreements might be narrow, they were still very deep.^21
The President declined to arbitrate between them. He preferred to
emphasize his priority for exposing the insincerity of the USSR’s recent