198 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
was allowable under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.^4 The Director of
the Strategic Defense Initiative, Lieutenant General James A. Abra-
hamson, warned that the budgetary cuts of 1985 compelled him to
reduce grants for some of his key laser projects.^5 Weinberger predicted
that if Congress introduced further cutbacks, it would ‘kill the pro-
gramme and play into the Soviets’ hands’. Meese called for a campaign
of publicity to convince Congress that the Defense Initiative would
lead to ‘many potential commercial by-products’.^6 With all this support
from the National Security Council, Reagan could stand firm by his
basic objectives. He would continue to promote the Defense Initiative
and modernize America’s retaliatory capacity while pursuing opportu-
nities for arms reduction.^7 Shultz was unusually quiet, perhaps seeing
that the balance of opinion was unfavourable. The result was that
nobody raised the matter of Gorbachëv’s recent proposal to confine
work on the space-based programme to the laboratories.
News about the stand-off in the American administration reached
Gorbachëv through reports in the New York Times. As he saw it, Wein-
berger and other officials wished to prolong the confrontation of
superpowers rather than take the path towards peace. Discommoded
by the lack of response to his offers of compromise, the General Secre-
tary passed a curt message to the President through Ambassador
Hartman expressing doubts that Reagan truly desired to ‘discipline
[his] ranks’.^8
He wished to put Washington into the dock of world opinion.
Whereas Reagan had sent warplanes on a punitive raid over Tripoli,
Gorbachëv ruled out any military action in pursuit of the ends of for-
eign policy: ‘I would not “bomb” Pakistan.’ The Asian factor should
receive priority. He thought it might be worthwhile to make an over-
ture towards China. Vadim Medvedev suggested building mutual
trust by proposing that intermediate-range nuclear missiles should
be removed from both sides of the Sino-Soviet frontier. Gorbachëv
welcomed the idea as complementary to his January declaration; he
called for work to be done on a properly staged plan for the removal
of all nuclear weapons from Asian territories – and almost as an after-
thought he suggested that the Indian Ocean should be declared a
demilitarized zone. Although such an outcome would inevitably dis-
concert the Americans, Gorbachëv hoped to assure Reagan that the
USSR was chiefly interested in peace across Asia and would stay clear
of ‘regional conflicts’ and ‘military groupings’.^9 Perhaps it was this
consideration that ultimately dissuaded Gorbachëv from approaching