200 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
policy. On 4 July 1986, when Mitterrand saw Reagan in Washington,
he urged the need for a renewal of direct talks between America and
the Soviet Union. He shared his doubts about the idea of completely
abolishing nuclear weapons. He repeated his scepticism about the
Strategic Defense Initiative. He warned Reagan to avoid including
French weapons in any projected agreement with Gorbachëv. This was
the standard French position, and Reagan listened calmly. He wished
for a resumption of negotiations with Moscow. On this at least he
could concur with Mitterrand.^17
On 7 July 1986 Gorbachëv welcomed Mitterrand to Moscow and
learned of France’s objections to his recent proposals. Mitterrand
stressed that although Reagan was committed to the Defense Initia-
tive, he was genuinely working in the cause of world peace. The
problem as Mitterrand saw things was that USSR and America were
aiming past each other: ‘In sum, the Americans want to negotiate
without renouncing SDI. And you want to make them renounce
SDI without negotiations. No progress is possible on this basis.’^18
He warned Gorbachëv that he would need to change his ideas if he
wanted a deal. The January declaration was inadequate as a basis for
talks. Gorbachëv could not have an agreement on nuclear armaments
without including an understanding about conventional forces. He
also had to take seriously the Western concerns about the SS-25s,
about the Krasnoyarsk radar station and about future arrangements
for verification.^19 Mitterrand was alerting Gorbachëv to what he had to
resolve before meeting Reagan. Gorbachëv remarked that he was
awaiting Reagan’s reply to a recent letter; he stressed that the Soviet
leadership was now willing to sign an arms agreement on condition
that America limited the Defense Initiative to laboratory research.^20
The President took until 21 July 1986 to draft a response to the
General Secretary’s messages in the previous month and show it to
his administration for comment. He asked his officials to consult the
American Congress and the NATO allies about the contents.^21 He
signed off the letter on 25 July 1986. He made his usual point that
there was no offensive purpose lurking behind the Strategic Defense
Initiative. He claimed the right for America to go on with its research
and testing for a further five years; he repeated the promise to share
the technology once its feasibility was demonstrated. He called for a
plan to reduce the stocks of all categories of offensive nuclear weapons.
He wanted strategic arsenals to be halved.^22
Soviet leaders undertook a review of Reagan’s foreign policy. In