SUMMIT IN REYKJAVIK 213also wanted talks to begin on missiles with a range of less than 1,000
kilometres. He called for both sides to guarantee to abide by the
obligations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. At the same time he
confirmed, face to face, his willingness to permit research and testing
on outer-space anti-ballistic defence projects so long as the work was
confined to laboratories.^25
Shultz immediately grasped that Gorbachëv had made a ‘sensa-
tional’ proposal.^26 But, like a poker player, he hid his pleasure; and
anyway it would be the President who dispensed the American cards.
As it happened, the sweep of Gorbachëv’s suggestions had made an
impression on Reagan. But as a veteran union negotiator, he kept calm
and inscrutable: he saw no point in relaxing his squeeze on the Soviet
delegation.
Reagan raised several matters of his own. He pointed out that the
Soviet leadership could exploit the situation by surreptitiously moving
their Asia-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles westward to
target them on Western Europe. He also called for the broadest inter-
pretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. He repeated his solemn
promise to share the Strategic Defense Initiative once it was com-
pleted; he saw this as a crucial contribution to world peace: ‘The
reason for this is that we can’t guarantee in the future that someone – a
madman like Hitler, for example – might not try to build nuclear
weapons.’^27 Gorbachëv said he hoped that these were only preliminary
remarks. He called for a constructive dialogue. Reagan assured Gor-
bachëv that he genuinely wanted to deploy the new strategic defence
system only after all ballistic nuclear missiles had been eliminated. The
USSR, he reasoned, should therefore have no fear of a first-strike
attack.^28 Although Reagan saw this as a conciliatory gesture, Gor-
bachëv remained unpersuadable about the Defense Initiative and
could not understand why Reagan lacked sensitivity to his concerns.
As the dispute rumbled on, the Soviet compromise over laboratories
faded from discussion.
The two teams broke for lunch, and the American delegation
adjourned to their ‘bubble’ in the Höfdi House to consider the morn-
ing’s proceedings. Shultz and the other Americans felt uplifted. Nitze
called it the best Soviet offer in a quarter of a century. Even Perle
admitted that Gorbachëv had made a noteworthy suggestion about
missiles in Europe, even if the Americans continued to have concern
that the Kremlin might suddenly move its weaponry from the Asian
bases into the USSR’s European zone.^29