21. THE MONTH OF MUFFLED DRUMS
The Reykjavik proceedings had started as a ‘pre-summit’ meeting. By
the end, everyone was calling it a summit in recognition of the impor-
tance of what had occurred. Gorbachëv had systematically spelled out
the Soviet negotiating position on nuclear arms for the first time. This
had enabled him and Reagan to go over many of the matters that
divided them. Indeed they had come close to a general agreement. But
Gorbachëv played his hand too hard, and Reagan called his bluff. Each
felt bitterly disappointed.
On the Aeroflot flight back to Moscow, Gorbachëv speculated on
Reagan’s conduct. He suggested that American conservative groups
were making such a fuss that the President was not truly ‘free in his
decisions’. ‘Certain circles in the West’, he contended, displayed a fun-
damental misunderstanding: ‘First: that the Russians are afraid of SDI
and therefore will go to any concessions. And second: that we have a
greater interest in disarmament than the United States.’ Yet the summit
had led to a lot of undeniable progress. But the Soviet and American
sides had agreed in principle on a scheme for a drastic reduction
in long-range and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. A further
advance remained possible, and Gorbachëv thought this justified
his decision to stick to an all-inclusive package of proposals. He had
pushed Reagan on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Strategic
Defense Initiative. He had forced the Americans to disclose the basis
of their thinking. He thought that he had proved to the Europeans and
the rest of the world that America and not the USSR was the main
obstacle to a nuclear disarmament treaty.^1
Reagan reached America tired and frustrated but equally sure that
he had pursued the right track. Speaking next day on prime-time tele-
vision, he held Gorbachëv responsible for wrecking the summit over
the Strategic Defense Initiative. But he still felt able to add: ‘I am still
optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the oppor-
tunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.’^2 The