222 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Kremlin, he said, had to take the first step. The White House would
stand firm by its foreign policy: ‘We prefer no agreement than to bring
home a bad agreement to the United States.’^3
Many on the political right had been ready to dispraise him. One
of them, Norman Podhoretz, felt a shiver of relief that he had stood
tall against the General Secretary: ‘Well, God watches over the United
States; but the truth is, Reagan actually did begin too much entranced
by arms negotiations . . . and the build-down of nuclear weapons
would have benefited the Soviets disproportionately. It was more of a
strain to them as a proportion, so to speak, of their economy.’^4 George
F. Will expressed thanks that Reagan had spurned the big deal on offer
in Iceland. His piece for Newsweek played on an old theme of Ameri-
can conservatives: ‘The formula for security is to keep your powder
dry – and have lots of powder.’^5 William F. Buckley wrote a personal
letter ‘just to tell you that, by God, you lived up to our faith in you’;
he also published an encomium in the National Review.^6 Inside the
administration, mouths were sealed in loyalty to the President. But
many felt the same way as Podhoretz and Will. Richard Perle hardly
bothered to disguise his opinion when on a briefing mission to
the Élysée Palace. He obviously regarded Reagan’s commitment to the
total elimination of nuclear missiles as disastrous; he was grateful that
the President had laid down conditions that Gorbachëv had found
unacceptable – and so catastrophe had been averted.^7
Margaret Thatcher was less easily soothed. While on the phone to
Reagan on 13 October 1986, she ‘went through the roof ’ on hearing
that the Americans had been discussing the total liquidation of nuclear
missiles. She pointed out that this could leave Western Europe at the
mercy of the USSR, which had massive superiority in conventional
forces and chemical weapons. Thatcher was committed to Britain’s
retention of its independent nuclear force so that the Soviet leadership
might never forget that ‘some British missiles would always get
through’. The only thing that consoled her was that Reagan had refused
to give way on the Strategic Defense Initiative. According to Thatcher,
this had averted an internal split in NATO. She left Reagan with no
illusion that he could take his allies for granted. The talks in Iceland
had shaken her confidence in him.^8
Thatcher invited Mitterrand to London, where she directed a fusil-
lade against Reykjavik. Reagan’s behaviour dumbfounded her: ‘I don’t
believe a word of it – he’s out of touch with reality! New weapons will
always get through the so-called SDI shield!’ She accused him of going