224 THE END OF THE COLD WAR
effectiveness. Gorbachëv had gone home empty-handed. She cele-
brated this outcome.^14 Mitterrand shared her determination to retain
nuclear missiles so as to deter a Soviet military offensive. He told aides
that ‘we brushed with catastrophe’ in Reykjavik.^15 The official concern
that existed in London and Paris was quietly shared in Bonn. West
European leaders feared that if the Americans were to rely exclusively
on their Defense Initiative, they would move – albeit not by deliberate
intention – towards an isolationist policy. Shultz had to listen to this
argument when reporting to NATO allies in Brussels the day after the
summit. He did what he could to reassure them; and, on the flight to
Washington, he sent a cable to Reagan emphasizing those features of
the Reykjavik talks that earned their applause.^16
Shultz hoped to prevent the President from underplaying his
achievement in Iceland. He wanted a display of pleasure. The under-
standings reached with the Soviet side about reductions in diverse
categories of nuclear weaponry were unprecedented. Shultz sent yet
another in-flight cable that stressed his ‘conviction, especially after my
session with our allies in Brussels today, that in fact you have an aston-
ishing success on your hands’.^17 He considered that Reagan had
smoked Gorbachëv out and extracted big concessions that the Soviet
leader could not now abandon.^18 Reagan refused to focus his energies
on the matter. So Shultz had to shoulder the load of defending the
administration’s corner.^19 He undertook a busy tour of TV studios and
gave a speech at a National Press Club luncheon.^20 Constantly he
underlined the progress that Reagan had made at the summit. He con-
tinued his efforts over the next few weeks as he crossed the country
- on 31 October 1986 he spoke in San Francisco and Los Angeles on
the same day.^21 His argument was that the USSR’s willingness to nego-
tiate was entirely attributable to the build-up of American military
capacity and promotion of the Strategic Defense Initiative.^22
TV anchors and newspaper columnists remained sceptical about
this analysis and suspected that Shultz was holding something back
from them. The Wa l l S t r e e t Jo u r n a l declined to offer support. The New
Yo r k Ti m e s editorial staff were equally discouraging. Few commenta-
tors outside the conservative ranks celebrated an Icelandic victory –
and most conservatives were more pleased about Reagan’s rebuff of
Gorbachëv’s demands than with anything of a positive nature.^23
Gorbachëv took a dim view of Reagan’s performance. When he
first reported to the Politburo, he scowled about how the President
had thrown away an opportunity to liquidate all nuclear weapons.